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 This study explores the constitutive relationship between human embodiment and 
spiritual formation. The primary thesis claims that embodied practices, far from being 
innocuous to spiritual life, serve formative functions. The purpose of this study centers on 
developing a practical understanding of the ways bodily and spatial practices can 
facilitate spiritual growth. Daily body regimes and bodily and spatial practices in worship 
services can become important means of addressing and facilitating spiritual formation. 
 Drawing on contemporary research in the cognitive and social sciences, this study 
intends to bring together embodiment and spirituality as co-constitutive elements in 
human existence and experience. Discovering the ways the body knows and makes sense 
of its world becomes essential to understanding how the body forms and informs spiritual 
experience. Current research in the cognitive and social sciences point out that 
apprenticeship and ritual practice are key ways the body makes meaning. Developing an 
integrative approach in which bodily life and spiritual life are intimately intertwined 
becomes essential to a biblical understanding of human existence. 
The study begins by situating the debate within historical contexts in an effort to 
identify the key philosophical and theological concepts which have come to situate and 
define the body. Contemporary conceptions of the body are then explored in order to 
understand the influence of postmodern thought on embodiment. A definition of the body 
and spirituality in non-reductive terms is offered in an effort to capture the 
multidimensional structure of each. The study concludes by exploring the practical ways 
the body contributes to spiritual experience and formation.  
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Western Christianity has long had an uneasy and ambivalent relationship with the 
material human body. The material reality of the human flesh, rooted in the everyday 
practices and concerns of the world, often seems incompatible with the formative 
purposes of the Spirit. This perceived incompatibility between the material and spiritual 
realms of human existence is less the result of poor theology than the consequence of 
poor practice. The modern Protestant Church, especially since the Enlightenment, has 
generally not taken material existence as essential to spiritual practice. The modern era’s 
insistence on refusing embodiment a meaningful role in epistemology and metaphysics 
has reduced spiritual experience to mere mental phenomena. A disembodied spirituality, 
however, becomes detached and disengaged from the daily practices of life, thus 
neglecting the formative influence of bodily habits and leaving the body and its daily 
practices outside the redemptive purposes of God.
1
      
Such neglect of the important role of the material body can be remedied through 
an integrative understanding of the ways in which embodied practice facilitates Christian 
spiritual formation. Employing an interdisciplinary approach, drawing from theology and 
the social sciences, this work examines the important formative function of sensate 
bodily practice in fixing meaning
2
 and shaping Christian spirituality. In a general sense, 
                                                          
1 Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciplines (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1988), 30-32. 
 
2 A major problem in determining meaning in discourses on spiritual experience has been the 
pervasive influence of epistemological methods that posit a disembodied rational “I” as the source. Such 
dualistic approaches tend to marginalize or neglect the role of the material body in meaning-making. 
Research in the social sciences in recent decades has revealed the important role of sensate bodily practice 
in making sense of human experience. For examples of this research in sociology and the sociology of 
religion, see Philip A. Mellor and Chris Shilling, Re-forming the Body: Religion, Community and 
2 
the term “Christian spirituality” refers to the essential human capacity to receive and 
transmit the life of God. The term denotes an awareness of the abiding presence of God 
as the Spirit of life and relationship that grounds and supports all human existence.
3
 
Practically applied, spirituality describes the ways ordinary people attend to their spiritual 
lives in everyday practice.
4
  
That human existence and practice are experienced in the body presents an 
undeniable fact, but how this fact determines the parameters of spiritual experience and 
directs discourse on spiritual practice remains a subject of scholarly interest. Conversely, 
the ways in which religious thought and practice construct understandings of the human 
body and its role in spiritual practice remain an important topic of investigation.
5
 Since 
the human body mediates all reflection and action upon the world, its centrality to any 
critical inquiry into religious and spiritual practice seems assured.
6
 The intimate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1997); Meredith B. McGuire, “Why Bodies Matter: A Sociological 
Reflection on Spirituality and Materiality,” Spiritus 3 (2003): 1-18; Meredith B. McGuire, “Religion and 
the Body: Rematerializing the Human Body in the Social Sciences of Religion,” Journal of the Scientific 
Study of Religion 29 (September 1990): 283-296. For examples of this research in social and cultural 
anthropology, see Margaret Lock, “Cultivating the Body: Anthropology and Epistemologies of Bodily 
Practice and Knowledge,” Annual Review of Anthropology 22 (1993): 133-155; Thomas J. Csordas, 
“Embodiment as a paradigm for Anthropology,” Ethos 18 (March 1990): 5-47. 
  
3 Richard Woods, Christian Spirituality: God’s Presence through the Ages (Chicago: Thomas 
Moore Press, 1989), 3-4. 
 
4 McGuire, “Why Bodies Matter,” 2. McGuire defines spirituality more broadly in terms of its 
sociological function, but the definition is useful in that it emphasizes everyday practice such that 
spirituality is understood as an active process and not merely as an abstract quality.  
 
5 For a volume of scholarly essays addressing these topics, see Jane Marie Law, ed., Religious 
Reflections on the Human Body (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
 
6  That this has not always been the case is pointed out by Meredith McGuire, “the present social 
science conceptions of our subject are particularly disembodied. Whether we are analyzing individual 
believers or religious organizations or religious ideas, the relationship of humans to their own bodies and to 
the bodies of others is remote or altogether absent from most of our work.” See, Meredith McGuire, 
“Religion and the Body,” 283-284. Likewise, Margaret Lock claims that “a perusal of the canon of social 
3 
connection between spirituality and material human bodies necessitates an investigation 
into the implications of practice for the body which might open the door for new 
embodied ways of engaging Christian spiritual formation.  
The body occupies a central place in Christian thought. The creation story affirms 
its goodness, the incarnation of Christ gives it theological significance, and the 
resurrection makes it an essential an enduring part of human life.
7
At its root, then, 
Christianity is an embodied faith, the religion of incarnation and resurrection of the flesh, 
and yet the important role of bodily practice in spiritual formation often gets neglected. 
Such neglect results in alienation of the body and, as a consequence, the broader material 
world, from spiritual practices. This alienation arises as a consequence of deeply 
entrenched dualisms inherited from our western metaphysical tradition; dualisms that 
form the conceptual framework through which the world is understood. Such conceptual 
framing divides reality into distinct categories such as sacred and profane, and spiritual 
and physical. Dualistic frameworks tend to privilege one side of the binary, thus 
presenting a problem for determining meaning since the meaning of spiritual practice gets 
divorced from its mediating source in bodily practice.  
Failure to recognize the interconnection between physicality and spirituality 
impedes the development of a proper spirituality sufficient to address everyday life in the 
world. Because this way of perceiving the world proves so pervasive, much of 
Christianity understands spiritual practice as a process of escaping the bondage of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and cultural anthropology indicates that the body’s explicit appearance has been sporadic throughout the 
history of the discipline.” See, Margaret Lock, “Cultivating the Body,” 133.  
 
7
 Colleen M. Griffith, “Spirituality and the Body,” in Bodies of Worship: Explorations in Theory 
and Practice (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1999), 67-68. 
4 
embodiment, or of controlling the body and subordinating it to the mind. It seems more 
appropriate, however, to understand spiritual practice as a process by which our material 
bodies are aligned with God’s purposes for them. Thus, as temples of the Holy Spirit, 
material bodies become the site at which the indwelling presence of God becomes 
manifest in the world.
8
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to offer an embodied spirituality rooted in 
evangelical faith and practice—to re-conceive the body as the per-formative center of 
spiritual practice and the site at which the fruit of God’s presence becomes manifest in 
the world. Thus, an embodied spirituality becomes per-formative; the bodily performance 
of apprenticeship, ritual, liturgy, and spiritual disciplines becomes spiritually formative 
practice. Such an embodied spirituality celebrates the material world, including the body, 
as sacred space and God’s good creation, thus opening the world as sacrament and 
symbol and bringing together spiritual practice and moral development as inseparable 
functions of spiritual formation.
9
 
Part One of this study addresses the social and historical milieus in which the 
human body became an issue for discussion. Determining what constitutes a body, and 
what purpose and function it serves, becomes determinative of its role in spiritual 
experience. Chapter 1 explores the historical developments of discourses and attitudes 
toward the body and its role in human experience in terms of their influence on Christian 
understandings of the role of the human body in spiritual practice. Throughout history 
                                                          
8 Elizabeth Lewis Hall, “What Are Bodies For? An Integrative Examination of Embodiment,” 
Christian Scholars Review 39 (2010): 173-174. 
 
9 For a recent work emphasizing the important connection between the material creation and 
redemption, see Jonathan R. Wilson, God’s Good World (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013). 
5 
attitudes towards the body have vacillated between ambivalence and embrace and these 
attitudes are reflected in Christian understandings of the body. Chapter 2 then explores 
the somatic turn in contemporary culture in an attempt to determine the ways in which 
various schools of social theory have come to understand the body. Contemporary cultic 
obsessions with the sensual both open the door for a deeper and richer understanding of 
embodiment and call the Church to beware of sinful preoccupation and narcissism. In 
recent decades feminism, race theory, consumer culture, the social and cognitive 
sciences, and technology have all shaped the way the body gets understood. The turn to 
the body in the social sciences has made the human body a central topic of study and has 
radically influenced Christian understandings of the role of the body in spiritual practice. 
 Part Two offers an interdisciplinary reflection on the body and spirituality in an 
attempt to illuminate the multidimensional nature of both. The complex nature of human 
existence and experience simply refuses any absolute reductive approach, thus 
understanding the body and spirituality in non-reductive ways proves helpful in 
determining the importance of embodiment to spiritual formation. Chapter 3 draws on 
contemporary research in the cognitive and social sciences in order to develop a holistic 
and multidimensional understanding of human embodiment and spirituality. This holistic 
approach brings material and spiritual experience together as correlative properties of 
human existence. This interdisciplinary approach has proven the importance of material 
practice to identity formation and meaning making. Chapter 4 develops the claim that 
bodily practice can either serve or hinder spiritual formation. Since material practice and 
embeddedness is an essential element of being human, there can be no escaping the 
formative powers of material practices. Practices imposed by consumer culture can and 
6 
do have a powerful impact on perceptions of spirituality and spiritual formation. Thus, 
the Church must be aware of practices that are subversive to true biblical spirituality. 
   Part Three brings together material practice and spiritual formation in an effort to 
develop the idea that human bodies serve as the loci of God’s glory and presence in the 
world. Humans are storied beings and the narrative character of theology helps situate the 
human condition within God’s redemptive plan. This redemptive plan involves human 
bodies, thus making embodiment essential. Chapter 5 examines the biblical story of the 
body in the context of the creation, sanctification, the life and ministry of Christ, and the 
theology of the Apostle Paul. Understanding the human person holistically offers a 
biblical and theological perspective affirming of the human body and its place in spiritual 
practice. Focusing on the Hebraic emphasis on calling, listening, memory, and fidelity 
offers a powerful biblical model for engaging the body in spiritual life. Chapter 6 then 
examines the role of the human body in the life and practice of the Church and argues for 
an essential relationship between the human body and the communal body of Christ. This 
chapter describes the important, but often neglected, role the human body plays in 
apprenticeship, ritual practice, and yearly festivals of the Church and brings together the 
Church as Body of Christ and the human body as essential and inseparable elements of 
spiritual formation. 
Part Four addresses some of the practical implications of reconceiving the 
material body as instrumental and functionally necessary to making sense of spiritual 
experience. Recent research in the social sciences has produced convincing evidence that 
the sensate body plays an essential role in meaning-making and identity formation.  
Chapter 7 explores ways to re-conceive human bodily practice in relation to belief, time, 
7 
and memory. This chapter offers embodiment as a methodological principle for 
understanding belief and practice as co-constitutive elements of human experience. 
Reconnecting with the rhythms and cycles of liturgical practice can be a way to re-engage 
the body in a spiritually formative way. Chapter 8 then explores the influence of bodily 
and spatial practice on ordering and making sense of the world and suggests that physical 
space serves an important role in directing bodily practice. Architectural form directs 
bodily practice and, as such, reveals attitudes and conception of spiritual processes. 
Additionally, architectural form influences and directs worship styles by promoting 
certain practices and impeding others. A description of the ways in which emotions, 
desires, and physical needs fit into the spiritual life is then explored. By exploring the 
analogy between bodily vision and spiritual vision, and the role of eros in human 
experience, it becomes possible to develop spiritual practices that take serious all aspects 
of human existence. Thus, far from being unnecessary or unbearable burdens to 
spirituality, the longings of the body can be celebrated as means by which the whole 









(RE)MEMBERING THE HUMAN BODY FOR SPIRITUAL FORMATION:  








A HISTORY OF AMBIVALENCE AND EMBRACE 
 
 
A prayer of blessing taken from a Jewish prayer book reads, “We thank You for 
the covenant sealed in our flesh.”
1
 Recited after each meal, this prayer calls those 
gathered around the table to remember their covenant relationship with God—a 
relationship marked in the flesh by circumcision. Carried in the flesh and enacted through 
communal historical memory, the ritual practice continually makes present the call of 
God to remember. This example of Jewish ritual practice serves to illustrate the 
importance of material bodily practice to spirituality.
2
 The content of the prayer calls 
attention to the material embeddedness of those engaged in the ritual act. The prayer 
repeated after a meal—acknowledging material provision necessary for sustaining the 
body—offers thanks for the covenant with its material provisions and requirements. 
Marking the flesh serves as material seal establishing and evidencing covenant identity 
                                                          
1 Andrea Lieber, The Essential Guide to Jewish Prayers and Practices (New York: Alpha Books, 
2012), 61; also Jules Harlow, ed., Siddur Sim Shalom: A Prayerbook  for Shabbat, Festivals, and Weekdays 
(New York: Rabbinical Assembly, 1985). For a discussion of the religious and ritual significance of 
circumcision, see Leonard B. Glick, Marked in the Flesh: Circumcision from Ancient Judea to Modern 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 
2 Other examples could be cited such as Sabbath rituals, death and burial rites, and the priestly 
blessing. See Louis Jacobs, “The Body in Jewish Worship: Three Rituals Examined,” in Religion and the 
Body, ed. Sarah Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 71-89. 
10 
and fidelity. This marking of the flesh serves no mere symbolic function, however, for it 
is more than an outward symbol expressing a state of affairs; rather, the performative act 
calls a state of affairs into being.
3
  
Embodied performance of ritual actions both form and inform by way of making 
meaning and establishing a sense of personal and cultural identity.
4
 Through material 
practices religious and spiritual meaning become inscribed in the body, thus bodily 
performance, the “doing” of the act, often precedes the cognitive act of interpreting 
symbolic intent, such that knowledge and practice conjoin in a pre-reflective 
understanding. In this way embodied practices serve to confirm the reality of the ritual 
act and not simply the symbolic idea.
5
 Ritual actions, therefore, embody a spiritual 
power; they do not merely express so much as create.
6
 Thus, the body matters. The 
material reality of the body serves as part of the grounding of human experience in 
reality.
7
 The vocalization of the prayer and the marked flesh remind the hearers that the 
material reality of the body provides a link to a reality that transcends the body. The body 
can be understood, therefore, as the site at which the relational and abiding presence and 
                                                          
3
 For a discussion of the role of embodied practice in the spiritual experience of ancient Judaism, 
see Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, trans. J. A. Baker (London: SCM Press, 1961), 404. 
 
4
 Robert Orsi notes how religious idioms if appropriated and inherited serve to establish identity 
and meaning by making the world rather than reflecting or mirroring it. See Robert Orsi, “Everyday 
Miracles: The Study of Lived Religion,” in Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice, ed. 
David D. Hall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 10. 
 
5
  McGuire, “Why Bodies Matter,” 4. 
 
6 Adam G. Cooper, Life in the Flesh: An Anti-Gnostic Spiritual Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 15. 
 
7 McGuire, “Religion and the Body,” 284. 
11 
power of God become most manifest to the world. The body becomes the locus of the 
Spirit’s formative, transformative, and performative power.  
The idea of practice marks a central feature of Hebraic thought, such that the 
assertion can be made that a person is what a person does.
8
 The assertion that a person is 
what a person does in the body should in no way imply that personhood can be reduced 
to mere biological function. No physical reductionism applies here, however, to claim 
that the material body is constitutive of an “I” seems justifiable, and yet, the “I” cannot be 
reduced to the body.
9
 This present work makes no pretense toward developing a 
theological or philosophical anthropology, as important as those are, the question here 
centers not on the “what” of the human person, but the “how” of spiritual formation. The 
practical outworking and relationship of material conditions and embodied practice to 
spiritual formation shapes the focus of this project. As the above example of Jewish 
spiritual practice demonstrates, the body plays an important role in determining an 
orientation to God, others, and the world. Nevertheless, in the history of religious 
thought, the body has been a contested site and attitudes toward the body have wavered 
between ambivalence and embrace. The present chapter provides a brief sketch of 
historical discourses on the body and its role in producing meaning and shaping identity 
in an effort to show how the body became a contested issue. Spirituality and spiritual 
formation are about meaning and identity, but neither can be sufficiently addressed 
independent of the material conditions which help shape them.  
 
                                                          
8
 For a discussion of the emphasis on practice over theory in Hebraic thought, see William Barrett, 
Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 69-91. 
 
9 Cooper, Life in the Flesh, 12-13.  
12 
The Contested Body: Theorizing and Material Practice 
 
The historian Caroline Walker Bynum published an article with this question in 
the title: “Why All the Fuss about the Body?”
10
 The article was written at the request of a 
friend who observed that contemporary scholarly literature on the body evidenced a lack 
of attention to the practical daily lived experience of embodied practice. The thinking was 
that an open dialogue between pre-modern and modern ideas of the body would 
reintroduce something of the day to day material experience of embodiment missing in 
contemporary literary and feminist theory.
11
 Pre-modern attitudes toward the body, it was 
assumed, were more attentive to the material bodily grounding of religious experience. 
As Bynum points out, however, her friend’s expectations were only partly right, for in 
both periods discourses on the body were multiple and multivalent.
12
 Pre-modern social 
and religious practices did indeed evidence a sense of the immediacy of bodies, as 
Bynum points out, but pre-modern approaches could likewise be highly abstract, dissolve 




Theorizing the Self as a Unified Point of Reference 
 
As Bynum’s work on pre-modern religious practice points out, many of the 
philosophical theories about the body developed in late antiquity and the high Middle 
Ages attempted to answer questions of the continuity of the self over time. In other 
                                                          
10 Caroline Walker Bynum, “Why All the Fuss about the Body? A Medievalist’s Perspective,” 
Critical Inquiry 22 (Autumn 1995): 1-33. 
 
11 Ibid., 1. 
 
12
 Ibid., 12-19. 
 
13 Ibid.  
13 
words, the central question in discourses on the body was, “How can the ‘I’ continue to 
be ‘I’ through time, both the time of the earth and the time of the eschaton?”
14
 Answers to 
this question inevitably shape perceptions of the body and its role in meaning-making and 
identity formation. The historical background to this question traces back at least to Plato 
who emphasized the self-identical and unchanging immaterial soul as constituting the 
unified self. Likewise, Plato’s emphasis on the self-identical and unchanging immaterial 
soul may be regarded as the historical basis for the idea of the self as a unified point of 
reference necessary for safeguarding personal identity and the continuity of experience—
an idea that dominated much early modern discourse. 
Conceptualizing the self in terms of the immaterial soul alone, reducing the self 
solely to cognitive function—which Plato did in the ancient world and Descartes and 
Locke did in the modern—neglects the important role of the body. As such, the self 
comes to be conceived as a unified agent accessible through introspection alone 
independent of any interactions with the body or any other external realities. This 
reduction of the self to distinct and independent categories of mind renders the body an 
object and its role a matter of debate. What results is a mind-matter dichotomy in which 
knowledge and theory are conceived as operating at the level of mind while the emotions 
and practice are identified with the body. This raises serious questions about the role of 
the body, however, thus rendering it a site of contested and competing theories. This 
issue becomes important, as evidenced in Bynum’s article, because conceptions of the 
body determine the basic guiding assumptions that govern theorizing about religion and 
spirituality. 
                                                          
14
 Ibid., 19-27. 
14 
Theorizing as Material Practice 
 
Theorizing on religion and spirituality often floats free from its mooring in 
material practice resulting in theory detached, disembodied, and indifferent to the daily 
lived experience of material existence.
15
 This need not seem surprising given that religion 
and spirituality are often conceived primarily as private and interior concerns unaffected 
by the givenness of daily embodied experience.
16
 Such theory, however, offers few 
resources to explore religious and spiritual experiences as they are formed and informed 
by daily material practices, for it fails to take account of the ways in which such 
experiences are materially grounded. Theory detached from the material embeddedness 
of its subject matter neglects the important influence material conditions such as bodily 
routines, cultural production, and economic and political conditions have on the making 
of meaning. Divorcing theory from practice in this way has exacerbated the inside-
outside distinction between mind and body, thus separating knowing from doing and 
establishing a causal priority of thinking over bodily acting.
17
   
The tendency in the study of religion and spirituality to bifurcate theory and 
practice as if they occupied different domains proves problematic to their study. Theory, 
on the one hand, has been identified with the abstract, the decontextualized, and the 
general, occupying the realm of ideas. Practice, on the other hand, has been identified 
with the concrete, the day-to-day actions, occupying the realm of the material. In this 
                                                          
15
 Terry Eagleton notes, “Traditional scholarship has for centuries ignored the everyday life of 
common people. Indeed, it was life itself it used to ignore, not just the everyday.” See Terry Eagleton, After 
Theory (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 4. 
 
16 See Orsi, “Everyday Miracles,” 6. 
 
17
 Andreas Reckwitz, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Cultural 
Theorizing,” European Journal of Social Theory 2 (2002): 251. 
15 
epistemological binary, theory and practice are positioned in opposition to one another 
and matter and meaning are separated. A serious problem surfaces here, however, for the 
practice of theorizing must itself be viewed in terms of material practice, as Karen Barad 
points out, “To theorize is not to leave the material world behind and enter the domain of 
pure ideas where the lofty space of the mind makes objective reflection possible. 
Theorizing . . . is a material practice.”
18
 Theorizing as material practice takes serious the 
co-constitutive relationship with its subject matter. An intra-relationship between theory 
and thing exists, such that, they do not exist in isolation from each other.
19
 It has been 




Arguably, then, theorizing about religion and spirituality must take account of the 
material conditions of human experience as co-constitutive of religious and spiritual 
experience. The body becomes the point at which theory and practice conjoin for, as 
David Chidester points out, “As material site, malleable substance, and shifting field of 
relations, the body is situated at the center of the production and consumption of religion 
and popular culture.”
21
 There has been, however, a long and ongoing debate concerning 
the relationship between the spiritual and the material and within this debate there has 
been no solely determinate notion of the body. The polyvalence of embodiment becomes 
                                                          
18 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Half way: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 55. 
 
19
 Richard Edwards, “Materializing Theory: Does Theory Matter?” Paper presented at the BERA 
Annual Conference (2009), http://www.spatialdesign.info/blog/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/Edwards-
R_MaterialisingTheory_doestheorymatter_.pdf (accessed October 5, 2013). 
 
20
 Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 152. 
 
21
 David Chidester, Authentic Fakes: Religion and American Popular Culture (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2005), 25. 
16 
evident in the history of western discourse on the role of the body in making meaning and 
identity formation.
22
 A cursory reading on this subject will attest that attitudes toward the 
body throughout history have varied from ambivalence to embrace. 
 
The Remembered Body: Ambivalence and Embrace 
 
To remember the body means more than mere historical reflection, it means to 
recall the body to its rightful place at the center of ongoing discourses on spiritual life.
23
 
There have been tendencies throughout Christian history to confirm the body as God’s 
good creation in theory, but to cast a negative shadow over it in practice.
24
 To remember 
requires coming to terms with the fact that the Christian tradition has long had an uneasy 
and ambivalent relationship with the material human body.
25
 The body presents an 
uncertainty, an opacity and resistance, which often opens a gulf between the spiritual 
person and bodily existence. At times the body seems to impose itself as if something 
                                                          
22
 Many scholars have argued that there is no such thing as “the body,” as an immutable and 
unitary substance; rather, they argue, there are multiple bodies marked by an infinite array of differences. 
See Margrit Shildrick and Janet Price, “Openings on the Body: A Critical Introduction,” in Feminist Theory 
and the Body, eds. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick (London: Routledge University Press, 1999); Barbara 
Holdrege, “Body,” in Studying Hinduism: Key Concepts and Methods, eds. Sushil Mittal and Gene Thursby 
(London: Routledge University Press, 2008). 
 
23
 Dallas Willard wrote, “Probably the least understood aspect of progress in Christlikeness is the 
role of the body in spiritual life.” See Dallas Willard, “The Spirit Is Willing: The Body as a Tool for 
Spiritual Growth,” in The Christian Educators Handbook on Spiritual Formation, eds. Kenneth O. Gangel 
and James Wilhoit (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1994), 225. 
 
24 There are reasons to be cautious of over attending the body and its sensual appetites. 
Embodiment does present liabilities to spiritual formation and carries alienating tendencies harmful to 
spiritual growth. At issue here are ways in which practice can hinder teaching. Spiritual practice can serve 
to alienate and neglect the body even though theologically we confess its goodness. For ways in which the 
body can be a liability to spiritual life, see Richard J. Foster, Life with God: Reading the Bible for Spiritual 
Transformation (New York: HarperColins, 2008), 126-127. 
  
25
 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). Brown claims that human physicality was in 
practice understood by early Christians in a wide variety of ways. The fact that there was no established 
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foreign, and indeed, often serves as a mask concealing rather than revealing the person.
26
 
The seventh century Abbot of Sinai, John Climacus, sums up this ambivalence well in 
reference to his own body: “He is my helper and my enemy, my assistant and my 
opponent, a protector and a traitor.”
27
 This struggle evinces a double vision; the body at 
once perceived negatively as an occasion of sin, and positively as God’s good creation. 
There is no escaping the matter, however, for physicality forms an essential and enduring 
feature of being human. Again, to quote Climacus, “How can I break away from him 
when I am bound to him forever? How can I escape from him when he is going to rise 
with me?”
28
 Indeed, the history of Christianity evinces a constant grappling with the 
question of how to transform the fallen human flesh in light of the integrity it represents 




The Church’s Dual Inheritance 
 
To gain a sense of the complexity involved in attempting an answer to this 
question requires a brief look back at some of the dominant historical voices and social 
conditions that gave shape to the metaphysical traditions through which the answer gets 
addressed. This brief historical survey serves only to reorient the discussion around the 
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practical issue of the formative function of embodiment in spiritual formation. To state it 
very simplistically, and in accord with a tradition partly popularized by Rudolf Bultmann, 
the Christian tradition is the heir of a double inheritance: the Hebraic tradition with its 
emphasis on calling-listening and memory-fidelity, and the Hellenistic tradition with its 
emphasis on seeing-discerning and thinking-possessing.
30
 The important influence of 
these traditions on Christian understandings of the material human body and its role in 
the spiritual life deserves consideration. Both of these traditions have been influential in 
the formation of Christian thought over the centuries, and both offer valuable insight into 
the relationship between bodily existence and spiritual life. It is important, therefore, to 
pause and draw out some critical distinctions between traditional Hebraic culture and the 
culture of the classical Greeks as those distinctions relate to conceptions of the body and 
its role in producing meaning. 
It must be acknowledged that any attempt to briefly trace the origin and 
development of ideas and neatly fix them within essentializing categories will inevitably 
tend to oversimplification and fail to do justice to the local diversity and tensions among 
fluid discursive and nondiscursive practices.
31
 As Karen King has demonstrated in her 
work on early Christianity, “literary works” and “intellectual influences” migrate 
between “heterogeneous social groups (as did Scripture and Platonic writings among 
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Jews, Christians, and Greek philosophers).”
32
 Intellectual influences get appropriated, 
transformed, and cross-fertilized as they are taken up by other groups, thus creating 
“complex, overlapping, and multifarious clusters of material.”
33
 This does not mean, 
however, that tracing salient lines of influence becomes impossible. There are evident 
categories of belief and practice from both Hebraic and Greek traditions that can be 
identified as influential on the formation of Christian conceptions of the body. 
To the classical Greek of the fifth century BC, human persons were thought of in 
terms of a single universal essence: reason.
 34
 As a rational animal the human person 
could discover objective and universal truths about the world and moral values through 
intellectual argumentation. Through reasoned contemplation alone the soul ascends to 
comprehension of the supreme Good. From this philosophical position, seeing becomes a 
mental act by which the mind discerns its object and through proper discernment takes 
cognitive possession of it. The bodily senses are a source of debate in early Greek 
thought; on the one hand, they are perceived as a hindrance to the pursuit of truth because 
they are often the source of deception and so cannot be fully trusted. On the other hand, 
the senses are perceived as a source of insight and a necessary precondition for 
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 Nevertheless, classical Greek culture conceptualizes a detached faculty of 
reason as the means to access objective, timeless, and universal truths.  
Things appear otherwise in traditional Hebraic culture where the covenant 
relationship with God becomes the locus of identity and not human reason. To the 
traditional Hebrew, truth cannot be grasped through reasoned contemplation alone, but 
must be discovered through obedience to God’s call and through faithful commitment to 
the covenant. Truth resides locally and historically, always in need of preservation 
through story and ritual practice which involves listening (hearing) and memory. The 
senses play an important role in remembering and passing on the covenant tradition since 
the covenant involves a relationship with God and others lived out bodily in this world. 
 Thus, an obvious distinction worth noting is that between the Hebraic privileging 
of hearing and practice and the Greek privileging of seeing and theory.
36
 If it can be said 
that the Classical Greek takes as essential the human ability to reason, then it must be 
pointed out that the ancient Hebrew takes as essential the human ability to relate, to sense 
the call of the sacred.
37
 These two worlds intersect and diverge at various points 
throughout Christian history, nevertheless, tracing the philosophical influences on 
conceptions of the body in the Western Church inevitably leads back to the intellectual 
world of the ancient Greeks and the writings of Plato. 
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Platonic Philosophy and the Body 
 
The Platonic view of the soul can be asserted with certainty, for Plato holds 
unquestionably to a chronological and ontological priority of the immaterial soul over the 
material body.
38
 Plato’s view of the body, however, does not appear as certain, for he 
seems never to have found an adequate solution to the most vexing problem concerning 
mind-body dualism, how a physical substance can relate to an immaterial substance. 
Thus, Plato’s view of the body appears to vacillate between rejection and refinement—
from the body as agent of harm to outright war between body and soul.
39
 The most 
positive view of the body appears in the Timaeus where Plato articulates a harmonious 
and holistic cosmology in which human constitution is perceived as corresponding to the 
constitution of the universe. The universal divine soul permeates the universe and holds it 
together in unity. In the same way, the soul holds the body together, animating it, moving 
it, and giving it life.
40
 Plato’s anthropology, therefore, mirrors his cosmology in which 
the human person comes to be understood analogously to the universe; the person 
perceived as a copy, a reflection, or an image of the cosmos. As living creatures, both the 
great body of the cosmos and the little body of the human being are endowed with 
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rational soul which gives life and direction to the body.
41
 Here rejection is not the 
emphasis, but disciplining and refining the body to make it a worthy and non-harmful 
receptacle of the soul.  
The body, with its sensual appetites, exists in a world of constant flux. The visible 
world of sense experience changes constantly, things come into being and go out of 
being, and therefore cannot be the locus of reality. The bodily senses are rooted in this 
changing world and, therefore, cannot be a legitimate and reliable source of knowledge, 
for if things are constantly changing they cannot be known with any sense of certainty.
42
 
To solve this epistemological problem Plato posits the world of being as eternal, 
unchanging, complete, and incorporeal. Reality exists only in the immaterial world of the 
intelligible and immutable Forms which are available only to the intellect. The 
immaterial intellectual soul, according to Plato, exists as the true person and it alone is 
immortal.
43
 Thus, for Plato the self or soul is eternal, self-identical, unchanging, and 
available only to the intellect. The intellect allows true sight, thus intellection becomes a 
kind of seeing—a seeing with the mind’s eye. 
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In the Platonic tradition seeing becomes an operation of the mind in which truth 
and beauty are perceived by the “eye of the mind” unsullied by sense perception.
44
 Here 
the rational soul, through a pure operation of the mind, ascends its dark cave of 
ignorance, frees itself from the chains binding it to the world of sensory experience, and 
comes to contemplate the true Forms of things.
45
 The temporal and mutable body, with its 
instincts and emotions, is made use of by the soul in this life, but remains extrinsic to true 
personhood. The body and its impulses, though not evil in Plato’s thought, are 
nonetheless a hindrance and must be subordinate to and controlled by the rational soul.
46
 
The worldly human condition then, in Platonic expression, is the intellect temporarily 
entombed in a material body from which it aspires to freedom. The body for Plato acts as 
a tomb imprisoning the soul and the ultimate future hope for the human person lies in an 
existence stripped of all physicality.
47
 In this sense, Plato articulates a view of the body 
that comes closer to rejection than refinement for, as he claims in the Republic, the soul 
must liberate itself from the “turmoil,” “confusion,” and “lust” associated with material 
existence, the soul “must be quit of the body” in order to return to itself.
48
 While Plato’s 
ambivalence toward the body is evident and needs to be recognized, it must likewise be 
recognized that not all Greek Philosophers held such drastic body denying views. 
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Aristotle and the Soul-Body Composite 
 
In contrast to Plato’s view, Aristotle contends that soul and body cannot be so 
clearly separated; form and matter are not two distinct entities, but “complementary and 
inextricably connected aspects of all living beings.”
49
 Given the inseparability of form 
and matter, Aristotle found no need of Plato’s universals as the realm of reality, for 
reality in Aristotelian terms resides in the particular things themselves. Furthermore, 
Aristotle insisted that the soul itself was made up of different parts, each having different 
functions. This alternative to the dualistic philosophy of Plato was available to early 




Aristotle clearly expresses a more unified theory of the human person in which 
soul and body are correlative principles in the same way as form and matter. The soul 
gives the body its true nature, thus becoming the actuality of a body that has the 
potentiality for life.
51
 The soul not only actualizes the body, it likewise provides it with 
shape, organization, and purpose. In other words, the soul acts as first principle of the 
body and serves as agent of the body’s related functions of life, growth, locomotion, 
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perception, sensation  and reason.
52
 Understanding the soul as the body’s final cause 
suggests that the body exists for the sake of the soul, nevertheless, Aristotle insists that 
the two cannot be separated.
53
 In this respect, Aristotle differs dramatically from Plato in 
denying the soul can pre-exist or survive the death of the body. The soul, in Aristotelian 
terms, since not a primary substance, cannot exist on its own independent of a body.
54
 
Thus, for Aristotle, the body and soul are one just as the wax and the shape given it by 
the stamp are one.
55
 In this sense, Aristotle represents a recovery of the body. 
As a rematerialization of Plato’s dualistic idealism, Aristotle’s recovery of the 
body and natural world provides the framework for the emergence of the natural sciences. 
It only stands to reason, for if form and matter cannot be separated, if forms are always 
located in material bodies, and reality exists in particular things rather than universals, 
then empirical knowledge of the world becomes legitimate and valuable.
56
 This unified 
view finds embodiment more favorable than did Plato, nevertheless, despite Aristotle’s 
emphasis on the unity of body and soul, he insists that reason remains separable and 
cannot be the act of a bodily organ.
57
 The human faculty of sensation remains dependent 
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upon the body, but mind, he claims, is separate and capable of thinking itself.
58
 The mind, 
according to Aristotle, because an unchanging and unmixed actualizing force, must be 
superior to the passive factor of matter.
59
 The mind for Aristotle becomes the Form of 
Forms and as such is immortal and eternal.
60
 Thus, in the end it appears that Aristotle 
never wrested free of the Platonic hierarchy of the disembodied mind, leaving knowledge 
a product of the power of the mind. 
The two philosophers do serve as the source of a common influence, however, for 
Aristotle, like Plato before him, develops a conception of sight as an extension of the 
power of the mind. Aristotle places much more emphasis on the bodily eye, however, 
claiming sight as the primary means of knowing and most preferred among the senses.
61
 
He does, nevertheless, prioritize the cognitive over the sensate. The pervasive influence 
of this occularcentric position proliferated by Plato and Aristotle becomes the grounds for 
the later subject-object distinction dominant in modern western metaphysics. In this 
schema the body gets understood conceptually as an object among other objects, an 
object which plays little role in making meaning, and which itself has no meaning outside 
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Stoicism and Gnosticism at the Extremes 
 
 Later thinkers develop positions on the body in dialogue with Plato and Aristotle, 
often expanding beyond them toward one extreme or the other. The Stoics for their part 
offer an anthropology in which the mind and the body constitute a single consubstantial 
entity, thus presenting the human person as a psychophysical whole.
62
 This 
anthropological view, in modified form, appealed to some of the early Church Fathers, 
but the Stoic indifference to suffering and their disdain for the bodily affections as errant 
impulses impeding the soul’s progress toward serenity led other Church Fathers to reject 
stoicism as contrary to Christian confidence in the essential goodness of God’s creation.
63
  
While early Christian thought evidences ambivalence towards the body, it does 
not endorse an outright rejection. The tension for early Christians centered on the struggle 
to transform the flesh, not deny it. Movements that outright reject the flesh typically are 
treated as heretical; such is the case with Gnosticism. Gnostic thought evinces a strong 
ontological dualism which favors spirit while disparaging the material world. The 
Gnostic despair of the material body produces escapist schemas of salvation in which 
disembodied existence proves essential to full spiritual freedom. Although Gnostic 
teachings were varied and complex, leading King to argue that there is no “Gnosticism” 
as a universal body of teaching;
64
 rejection of the material world including the body 
proves a common theme throughout Gnostic thought. Unfortunately, even though 
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considered heretical, Gnostic like influences can be found in the Christian tradition.
65
 As 
Luke Timothy Johnson notes, “[Christianity’s] repulsion of [Gnosticism] did not make it 





Early Christianity and the Body 
 
While each of these traditions evidences an influence over the Church’s 
theological formation of the body, only Gnosticism insists on a disparaging view of 
materiality. Early Christianity, it has been pointed out, was in practice a material religion 
in which spirituality was closely tied to material concerns such as healing, nutrition, and 
fertility.
67
 The body became a source and grounds for making meaning in the world and, 
Keith Thomas points out, during the Middle Ages people often sought meaning through 
bodily immersion in religious and spiritual practice.
68
 In other words, the medieval 
church engaged the bodily sensual impulses of the people by organizing activities 
through sacred and symbolic ritual practices which engaged the body.
69
 The Eucharist 
served as one of the main ritual practices and, as Vasquez notes, “The centrality of public 
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Medieval Christianity’s conception of embodiment arises out of ancient religious 
preoccupations with the immediacy of the body, so that the incarnation did not present 
such a paradox to the early Christian mind. Indeed, early Christians understood their 
bodies in relation to Christ’s body, as Peter Brown points out, they understood the body 
as a symbol of Christ’s victory over death and the corrupt worldly order.
71
 Likewise, 
Bynum’s work on medieval religious practice emphasizes a remarkable continuity 
between the spiritual and the material regarding concern for the resurrection of the body 
which, as she points out, was consistently represented through tropes of organic growth.
72
 
The concept of the human person in medieval Christian belief, Bynum argues, was 
neither the soul escaping the body, nor the soul using the body, but a holistic self 
integrally bound to sensation, emotion, reasoning, and identity.
73
 Thus, Bynum’s work in 
medieval Christian belief evidences a sense of the immediacy of the body.  
Early Christian practice involved, what Mellor and Shilling refer to as, “body 
regimes” which intended to encourage people to transform their fallen and sinful bodies 
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through meaningful bodily practices.
74
 In other words, the fall brought with it a tension 
between the passions of the body and the formation of the spirit which required attention 
and religious practices was the means of working through this tension. Nevertheless, 
early Christians continued to view the body as an integral part of the spiritual life.
75
 
Throughout the middle ages, Mellor and Shilling point out, “bodies maintained a sensual 
relationship with the sacred” and thus were present and active in spiritual life.
76
 This 
more sensual view of the body began to change, however, with the changing attitudes of 
the Modern period and the rise of Reformation movements. 
The Long Reformation had the effect of de-sensualizing the faith; it moved 
religious life away from bodily forms of ritual practice towards a more cognitive 
understanding of religion.
77
 The Reformation moved Christian practice away from 
images and rituals toward the written text, such that, ritual actions no longer had the 
power to bring about a real state of affairs; rather, they became mere representations and 
forms of symbolic communication.
78
 Thus, in Protestantism bodies became more 
centered on words and symbols than the sensory impulses of the body. As Mellor and 
Shilling note, “The eyes and ears were valued insofar as they had the potential to provide 
unsullied access to the word of God, but touch and smell were certainly implicated in the 
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 This move bears a connection with the western tendency to equate 
the eye with the mind—to conflate seeing with knowing—while neglecting the fact that 
sight itself is one of the senses. 
 
Modernity and the Dismembered Body 
 
The body and its role in making meaning and establishing identity encounters 
further problems in the modern period with new developments in philosophical method. 
Socio-cultural forces began straining old structures of authority in religion, education, 
and politics.
80
 Individualism and skepticism began to develop new responses to old 
questions of human existence. New discoveries of ancient texts offered alternative views 
to those offered by the church. The rise of the mechanical universe with its mechanistic 
understanding of the body and the displacement of Aristotelian cosmology raised doubts 
about epistemological certainty. This paradigm shift in cosmology also raised questions 
about the nature of the human, for premodern thinkers tended to understand the human 
person as a microcosm of the universe.
81
 With the authority of the church, government, 
and education in doubt, the search for new ways to ground the self and knowledge got 
underway. 
The philosophical traditions of empiricism and rationalism arise as an attempt to 
address this epistemological conundrum and overthrow skepticism. Both traditions seek 
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to make knowledge of the real world possible, to return epistemological certainty to the 
human quest to know the self and its world, and they attempt to do so by introducing a 
single epistemological method.
82
 Though the methods differ, the empiricist grounds 
knowledge in experience while the rationalist insists on the primacy of ideas, they both 
share a similar consequence, for they begin with the knowing subject rather than the 
object. In order to confront skepticism, modern metaphysics moved from subjective 
certainty to objective knowledge.
83
 Unlike the ancient and medieval thinkers, for whom 
the object of knowledge could be anything in the world of being, the modern rationalists 
and empiricists reduced knowledge to impressions or ideas in the mind.
84
 In both 
traditions the sensate knowledge of the body becomes marginalized, neglected, or 
ignored. 
 
The Disembodied “I” of Descartes and Locke 
 
Neglect of the sensate body becomes most evident in the Cartesian “I” in which, 
disembodied and detached from the outside world, as though cloistered alone in a stove-
heated room near Ulm on the Danube, Descartes could come to comprehend the world 
purely by the mental power of judgment.
85
 For Descartes, self-consciousness, and 
therefore selfhood, resides in the human self-awareness of thinking. Thinking sets the 
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human apart from other existing matter, for thought is self-contained and has no 
extension as does material objects. The mind differs altogether from the body, for the 
body as material object can be divided into parts, whereas the mind is indivisible. All 
ideas, even those of the self and God, have their formal basis in the mind.
86
  
The “I” cut off from the phenomena and detached from the physical world stands 
as it were a disembodied eye in which sight becomes an operation of the mind. Such an 
epistemological enterprise prioritizes mind and sight over the other senses; understanding 
the mind (sight) as capable of perceiving the primary qualities of an object, qualities that 
are quantifiable, while the body (senses) appreciates only secondary qualities such as 
odor, texture and taste. The bodily senses, like the unfaithful spouse, fall forever under 
the queer eye of suspicion, for they cannot be trusted, forever risking pollution of the 
visual perceptions of primary qualities.
87
 True knowledge must be sought, according to 
Descartes, by observers “fixing their eyes on a single point to acquire through practice 
the ability to make perfect distinctions between things, however minute and delicate.”
88
 
Thus, predicated on sight as an objective means of discovering the external world, objects 
fill the role of recordable evidence that allows the mind to make sense of visual 
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perception in a rational unbiased manner. Serious implications follow from so drastic a 
dichotomy however, the notion of sight as an operation of the mind, separate from a 
function of the body and indifferent to context, led inevitably to the idea of observation as 
an objective, neutral, and detached activity, as opposed to an active engagement with the 
object of investigation. By arguing that mental acts have no inherent relation to physical 
acts Descartes set the course for the separation of the mind from the body, the intellectual 
from the sensual, and the seer from the seen.  
It may be assumed that the rationalism of Descartes lends itself more readily to 
notions of a disembodied “I” than does Locke’s empiricism which grounds its claims in 
experience. While Locke did deny the Cartesian notion of innate ideas in need of no 
further clarification, he does, nevertheless, ground the existence of the self in immediate 
self-awareness. Identity, according to Locke, rests on conscious awareness of the self 
over time. Unlike Descartes, however, Locke insists that personal identity cannot consist 
in sameness of substance—in the case of Descartes it was soul substance—because 
conscious awareness of the present self with the past is what constitutes personal 
identity.
89
 Following in similar fashion to Plato, the Lockean notion of the self is an 
immaterial and immutable agent detached from and independent of any relationship to 
the material body or world. Thus, personal identity, in Lockean terms, has a 
psychological rather than a metaphysical basis. 
The dominant epistemological traditions of the modern period, with their 
insistence on a single method centered in the mind of the perceiving subject, led 
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inevitably to the absence and fragmentation of the body. Thus, talk about propositions, 
logical relations, truth conditions, concepts, and cognitive meaning dominate modern 
philosophical and theological discourse, but little gets mentioned of the real flesh and 
blood of bodily being-in-the-world.
90
 Contemporary research refers to this neglect as the 
absent body.
91
 While the body may have experienced an absence, as research suggests, it 
did not altogether disappear, for thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
and Michele Foucault re-membered the fragmented body by confronting the cognitivist 
and mechanistic presuppositions of previous thinkers. The works of these thinkers 
refocused the discussion to the relationship of the person to the world, thus marking a 
paradigmatic shift which would unite again the cerebral and the sensual.
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CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSES: EMBODIMENT AS A PAPRADIGM 
 
 
 The previous chapter points out how  diverse and ambivalent attitudes toward  the 
body in pre-modern thought, including  reformation attempts to eliminate the sensual 
aspects of religious practice, fed into the modern notion of the autonomous, rational, 
disembodied self of Cartesian dualism. This Cartesian approach offered the Church a 
buttress against the rising pressures of modern skepticism by grounding certainty in the 
mental judgment of the knowing subject.
1
 Such a methodological approach came at a cost 
to the study of religious and spiritual life, however, for subsequent developments of the 
Cartesian model afforded little to no role for the human body in shaping or explaining 
religious and spiritual experience. In the Cartesian model all knowledge, including 
knowledge of God and spiritual experience derives solely from cognitive processes, thus 
human persons come to be perceived in terms of believing, disembodied minds.
2
 
Consequently, religious discourse tends to pay little attention to human material 
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embeddedness such as embodiment, emplacement, cultural productions, and the political 




Embodiment, Knowledge, and Practice 
 
 Failure to adequately account for ways in which material practices facilitate 
understanding, reinforce values, and form meaning leads to a serious disconnect between 
belief and practice. In such a case, religious belief—understood in terms of cognitive 
appropriation of a body of doctrine—comes to define the essence of Christian life. While 
religious practice—understood as mere representation of already formed beliefs—plays 
the supportive role of evidencing or expressing beliefs. Likewise, spirituality becomes a 
matter of the inner life, in which case, attending to the spiritual life means separation 
from the material realities of this life, thus leading to a separation of “knowing” from 
“doing.” Consequently, questions concerning the nature and status of material practices 
such as church rites and rituals have become contested issues subsequent to the debates of 
the Long Reformation.
4
 Fueled by the modern insistence on a purely intellectualist or 
cognitivist approach, Protestantism experienced a paradigmatic shift in thinking about the 
formative role of religious rites and ritual practices. Thus, in much of modern 
Protestantism rites lose the status of real actions and become nothing more than 
representations, in other words, merely a means of symbolic communication.
5
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Historian Edward Muir has demonstrated convincingly that the “Long 
Reformation” marks a revolution in ritual theory in which the old ritual privileging of 
practice gets replaced by the new ritual privileging of cognition.
6
 Regarding ritual 
practice, Robertson Smith notes, the Western Church understands ritual as “important 
only in connection with its interpretation” and  the study of religion “has meant mainly 
the study of Christian beliefs, and instruction has habitually begun with creed, religious 
duties being presented to the learner as flowing from dogmatic truths he is taught to 
accept.”
7
 This paradigmatic shift marks a turning point in which emphasis on bodily 
ritual practices get eclipsed by the priority of right belief within a text-centered 
cognitivist approach which focuses primarily on preaching and teaching. Consequently, 
the ways in which bodily practices shape and form an understanding of spirituality gets 
lost or neglected. In response to this dominantly text-centered, doctrinal, and cognitive 
approach comes the call for a more contextual, material, and dynamic understanding of 
religious beliefs and spiritual practices.
8
 Embodiment offers a methodological perspective 
through which a serious consideration of the ways in which material practices and 
embeddedness comes to form and inform understandings of spirituality.   
 
Embodiment as a Paradigm 
 
 Forms of embodiment serve as a means to (re)member the fragmented body 
produced by modern thought and to correct the misunderstanding of the relation of body 
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to mind and body to world. Embodiment does not refer to the body as such, it does not so 
much refer to enfleshment; rather, the term intends to describe the general habits, 
techniques, or types of habitus characteristic of bodies within particular times and 
places.
9
 Embodiment refers to the sets of practices that constitute individual bodies in a 
particular context; bodies that are always affected by social factors. In other words, 
bodies mediate our relationship to the surrounding world, as Merleau-Ponty claims, “The 
body is our general medium for having a world.”
10
 Thus, situated on the level of 
experience, embodiment describes the ways in which “making sense” and 
“understanding” take place in a pre-reflexive, even pre-objective, but not pre-cultural 
way.
11
 Embodiment precedes objectivation and representation, therefore, and describes a 
way of being-in-the-world, thus embodiment becomes the means by which the dualities 
of subject-object, cognition-emotion, and mind-body are collapsed.
12
 
 Embodiment can serve as a paradigm, or consistent methodological perspective, 
by which to study spirituality. Such a methodological approach begins with the postulate 
that the body serves as the cognitive ground of culture.
13
 Returning the body and bodily 
practices to the center of discussions on “making sense” allows for serious consideration 
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of all aspect of bodily being. It allows for a serious investigation of the role of the senses 
and emotions in both forming and informing spirituality.  
 
Collapsing the Hierarchies of Dualistic Structures 
 
To collapse the dichotomies of spiritual-material, sacred-profane, and subject-
object should not be understood to imply erasing difference, or to reduce them to the 
same; rather, it means collapsing the illegitimate hierarchy often ascribed within dualistic 
categories, thus allowing both sides an equal voice within dialogue. Dualisms always 
present a problem of delineation, for the ability to determine clear lines of demarcation 
proves illusive. Even more to the point, Derrida challenges the very logic of either/or 
dualisms, arguing that neither side of the binary opposition can exist without the other, 
for they are both interdependent and related.
14
 Likewise, Vivian Burr argues, “to give 
anything an identity, to say what it is, is necessarily also to say what it is not. In this 
sense, presence contains absence. That is, to say that a quality is present depends upon 
implying what is absent.”
15
 
 The functional purpose dualisms serve in providing the ability to conceptually 
communicate different spheres of human existence makes their use necessary, but the 
illegitimate prioritizing of one side to the neglect of the other proves problematic. 
Historically, the clear delineation of the mind from the body, the spiritual from the 
material, and the sacred from the profane, has had the debilitating effect of removing 
God, and spiritual life in general, from the everyday routines and practices of being-in-
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the-world. Returning to the material embeddedness of everyday life, therefore, becomes a 
necessary condition for developing a biblical spirituality. 
 
(Re)Membering the Body 
 
 A broad materialist response to the disembodied “I” of Cartesian dualism 
appeared quickly. The idea that the true immaterial “self” existed apart from and 
independent of the material body would not go unchallenged. Early responses came from 
such thinkers as Hobbes, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Spinoza, all of whom address the 
human condition in more unified and materialist terms. Each of these thinkers identify 
problems with separating the mind from the body and raise serious questions concerning 
the relationship between mind and body. Nevertheless, the human person was treated in 
isolation leaving a further issue to be addressed, that of the relationship of embodied 
agent and world.  
Friedrich Nietzsche proves most influential in laying the groundwork for an 
investigation into the relationship between agent and world. Nietzsche’s attempt at an 
embodied non-reductive materialist response to Cartesian dualism set in motion a line of 
thinking critical of forms of internalism that privilege the mind as the autonomous sphere 
of inquiry. Neitzsche’s work would influence thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, who in 
turn influenced Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and together these thinkers brought about a 
renewed interest in the embodied nature of being-in-the-world. Cumulatively their work 
has evidenced that a privileging of the mind to the neglect of the body makes it difficult 
42 
“to foreground the external manifestations of religion” such as embodiment, 




Nietzsche: The Embodied Self 
 
 Nietzsche critiques traditional Western metaphysics for what he perceives as a 
nihilistic, body despising and life-denying dualism of a true and an apparent world. His 
writings offer a resistance to the traditional bifurcation of the spheres of felt and imagined 
experience, or what in the West has been distinguished by body and mind.
17
 Addressing 
his reader through the mouth of his prophet, Nietzsche has Zarathustra proclaim, “I wish 
now to speak to those despisers of the body.”
18
 The despisers of the body are those who 
hold to the traditional Platonic-Christian metaphysics dominant in western culture. 
Traditional western metaphysics, Nietzsche contends, relocates the plenitude of this 
world to an ideal realm in which knowledge, truth, and a unified ahistorical self can be 
accessed solely by the powers of mental judgment. This metaphysical framework 
undergirds Christian teaching, denies the body, and as Nietzsche understands it, reduces 
the role of the body to nothing more than mere signification.
19
 Against the 
representational epistemology such a metaphysical framework entails, Nietzsche offers a 
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praxis-oriented philosophy in which practice becomes the role of the body; thus, 
Zarathustra can claim the body “does not say ‘I’ but performs ‘I’.”
20
  
Nietzsche conceives of a variety of arrangements configuring integrated relations 
between mind and body.
21
 The body serves as vehicle for the historical and social 
manifestations of will to power. The notion of an ahistorical self proves to be nothing 
more than the transitory construction of the body’s will to power asserting itself in a 
given context.
22
 In creative fashion he infiltrates the language of metaphysics in order to 
use it against itself.
23
 Nietzsche employs the language of physiology in order to explicate 
the will to power and he employs the language of medical physiology as a way of 
describing the body as sick, as a way of referring to the situation of decadence brought on 
by adherence to traditional dualistic metaphysics. The use of physiological terms such as 
heart, breath, exhaustion, confusion, joy and others, are employed as ways of contesting 
body-soul dualism. In other words, Nietzsche teaches a thoroughly embodied notion of 
the self: “But the awakened, the enlightened man says: I am body entirely and nothing 
beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body.”
24
  
 The human being as material body is projected as a part of and involved in the 
contest of forces that give rise to material becoming, as such Zarathustra proclaims, 
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“Thus the body goes through history, evolving and battling.”
25
 The thinking of will to 
power takes the body as its methodological starting point, not in order to establish a new 
metaphysical ground; rather, the idea of multiple physiological becomings undermines 
ontologies founded on the assumption of the self as a unitary and transcendental point of 
reference and identity.
26
 The body and the self are culturally and historically situated 
artifacts, products of contested forces of power relations, interests, and desires. The 
constitution of the self involves a reciprocal shaping occurring among the ideational, 
psychosomatic, and the socio-physical.
27
 The ongoing reciprocal movement across these 
three planes highlights the social influence in the formation of meaning which always 
includes the body.
28
 As such, knowledge becomes the product of the embodied self in 
relation to the world and such knowledge is always perspectival.  
 By identifying the role of the body in the formation of the concept of self and the 
formation of meaning, Nietzsche returns the focus of discussion to the historical and 
cultural relationship of embodied agent to the world. The body carries with it the history 
of its disciplining; it has a genealogy tied to its cultural and historical situatedness. The 
Christian religion plays an important role in the genealogy of the body for, as Nietzsche 
understands it, Christianity offers a way of escaping the unpredictable and ever changing 
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 Rather than embrace the anxieties of a precarious earthly existence, 
Christianity made a way of escape by denying the body’s will to power and creating an 
ahistorical self and a transcendent God who ensures stability, absolute truth, and 
predictability. In this sense Nietzsche understands Christianity as playing a pivotal role in 
the rise of modern thought.
30
 
 Nietzsche’s understanding of the history of Christian thought seems too narrow to 
do the tradition any real justice and his reading of Christianity’s role in the rise of modern 
thought appears too simplistic. Nietzsche does, nevertheless, provide the groundwork for 
an analysis of the relationship of agent and world and he does bring a renewed interest in 
discussions of the body and its role. Nietzsche’s key points remain worthy of 
consideration: The language of traditional Platonic-Christian metaphysics elevated 
intellect over body thereby diminishing the importance and status of the body in forming 
a concept of the self and in forming meaning. In Nietzsche’s writings there is a playful 
and strategic inversion of the two, a reversal of values occurs in which the status of the 
body is elevated over that of the intellect.
31
 The body and mind get conflated, but 
Nietzsche also distinguishes them by interposing the body between the forces of the 
external world and the concepts of the internal mind.
32
 This conflation allows the body to 
unite the mind and world in a non-dualistic manner while avoiding a reductive 
materialism or spiritualism; thus, the interpretive status of body as metaphor assists in 
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avoiding reductive materialism, idealism, and metaphysical dualism.
33
 It is by bringing 
body, mind, and world together in a non-reductive, non-dualistic way that Nietzsche 
offers a means of understanding the importance of embodiment to meaning-making and 
identity formation. Nietzsche’s emphasis on the relationship between agent and world set 
the groundwork for further inquiry into the ways in which embodiment both forms and 
informs our understandings of spirituality. 
 
Martin Heidegger: The Historicized and Emplaced Self 
 
Heidegger responds to the decontextualized and disembodied concept of 
subjectivity predominant in much of the theology, philosophy, and science of his day by 
proposing a historicized and embedded self. The lack of a leading fore-structure marks 
the fundamental failure of the decontextualized and disembodied approach to 
subjectivity, according to Heidegger.
34
 The fore-structure describes Dasein’s
35
 unique 
interpretive tendency which comes “be-fore” any propositional judgment concerning the 
nature of the objects of experience.
36
 Opposed to the idea that the self relates to the world 
in strictly intellectual terms, Heidegger understands the self’s relation to the world in 
terms of care and praxis. Prior to any theoretical understanding of an object, arrived at by 
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abstracting it from everyday life in order to determine its fundamental essence, there is 
the manner in which Dasein relates to the object in everyday use. The fundamental 
character of Heidegger’s notion of fore-structure is care and praxis in which Dasein 
transforms its everyday encounter and use of objects into a meaningful life world. 
Meaning and self-identity arise out of “a comportment toward beings” and is always 
under threat of being concealed by propositional judgments.
37
 Meaning arises out of an 
embedded and historicized relationship in which Dasein discloses meaning to itself 
within historical horizons.
38
 In this way, the world should not be understood as an object 
made intelligible only when the “I” predicates something of it; rather, the world is there 
prior to thought, there as already lived.  
Heidegger seeks to de-structure the subject-object schema in an attempt to rethink 
Dasein. The human person should not be understood as subject standing over against the 
world as object, rather Dasein should be understood as already being-in the world, where 
the “being-in” defines and describes a phenomenological relationship. This pre-reflective 
and pre-theoretical form of access, Heidegger refers to as understanding, and should not 
be taken as a specific act of cognition.
39
 As Grondin points out, this new conception of 
understanding refers primarily to a way of existing, or a fundamental mode of being by 
which people cope with and find their way around in the world.
40
 This pre-theoretical 
form of access defines a certain familiarity that life already has of itself; it describes a 
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“spontaneous experience of experience.”
41
 Yet, as a mode of being, understanding 
remains for the most part implicit, for it does not need conscious thematization as people 
are always already engrossed within it.
42
 Understanding then marks a fundamental 
moment belonging to Dasein’s existence, a moment that somehow involves the notion of 
possibility. This bringing together of understanding and possibility occurs because 
understanding has the character of projection, and Heidegger refers to this projective 
character of the understanding as sight.
43
 Dasein’s being-in-the-world constitutes a being-
towards in which the being-towards the world serves as the referential totality of 
involvement in which entities within the world comes to be understood. That is, it marks 
a being-towards the “for-the-sake-of-which,” constituting a reflexivity giving rise to a 
self-understanding. For Heidegger then, meaning-making can only take place within a 
relationship to the world and other beings in which subject and object are co-constituted 
within a reflexive relation of understanding, projection, and possibility. 
Heidegger brings together the notions of understanding, projection, and 
possibility by showing that the projecting of the understanding has the possibility of 
developing itself, or referring back to itself.
44
 This notion of reflexivity, Heidegger 
describes as interpretation, and within interpretation the understanding “becomes itself,” 
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hence the two are intimately connected.
45
 A situation now obtains in which this 
reflexivity allows the understanding to project itself upon other entities, as well as, upon 
itself. There will accordingly be different kinds of interpretations, such as the 
interpretation of objects in the world and interpretation of the self.
46
 Thus, Heidegger 
offers a new conception of seeing in which factical life experience involves and includes 
both the “how” and the “what.” 
Heidegger insists on maintaining the dynamic interplay that takes place between 
Dasein and its world, he simply forbids the separation of the knowing subject and the 
known object, for life experience simply cannot be reduced to a process of “taking 
cognizance of.”
47
 For this reason, Heidegger employs a methodological tool, namely 
formal indication, by which he intends to turn the interpreter’s gaze from an explanation 
of what it means to exist towards an understanding of how human beings relate to their 
experiences.
48
 To do this he suggests that facticity includes the enactment of meaning or 
understanding within a tripartite structure: the content-sense, or the “what” of a life 
tendency; the relational-sense, or the “how” of a tendency; and the enactment-sense, or 
                                                          
45




 Heidegger’s discussion of interpretation is found in Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 32. 
 
47
 Jean Greisch, “Heidegger’s Methodological Principles for Understanding Religious 
Phenomena” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life, ed. By S.J. McGrath and 
Andrzej Wiercinski (New York: Rodopi, 2010), 137. 
 
48
 For a discussion of Heidegger’s use of formal indication see Lars Bruun, “Back to the Future: 
Reading Heidegger Reading Paul,” The Bible and Critical Theory, 5 (2009): 2-3; also for an extended 
analysis of formal indication see Hent de Vries, “Formal Indications” in MLN, 113: 3 (April 1998): 635-
688; Sean J. McGrath, “Formal Indication, Irony, and the Risk of Saying Nothing” in A Companion to 
Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life, ed. S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski (New York: 
Rodopi, 2010), 179-205. 
50 
the enactment of meaning.
49
 It follows then, that the enactment of meaning presupposed 
by attending to the manner in which the subject of experience relates to the experience 
can only be formally indicated, for the philosophical concept acts as a guide, an indicator 
and nothing more.
50
 Heidegger’s analysis begins with Dasein already in a situation, the 
enactment-sense, which then determines both the relation-sense and content-sense.
51
 The 
effect of this crucial shift, as McGrath points out, is a radical de-centering of 
intentionality, a dislodging of the ego from its constitutive transcendentality.
52
  
The importance of Heidegger to the discussion of the relationship of spirituality to 
embodiment follows from his insistence that “Dasein itself has a being-in-space of its 
own,” as a result of its bodily nature.
53
 Unlike other objects, Dasein does not merely 
occupy a position in space; rather, Dasein appropriates the objects that are given by its 
embodied nature thus entering a relationship in which meaning can be made. The life-
world occupied by Dasein is inextricably social and, as such, the social processes that 
make up this world have the power to shape the subject through situated practices that 
serve to shape identity and form meaning.  
Merleau-Ponty: Embodiment as Methodological Principle 
Heidegger grounds the event of understanding in a pre-reflective, reflexive 
relation of subject to its object in which the two are co-constituted and meaning arises 
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from within a lived experience of being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty puts flesh to 
Heidegger’s theory by emphasizing the embodied nature of Dasein. The pre-reflective 
experience raised by Heidegger and developed further by Merleau-Ponty simply insists 
that prior to assigning meaning to an object the subject engages it on a bodily level. This 
embodied rootedness of being-in-the-world together with a deep pre-reflective 




The principle duality of concern to Merleau-Ponty is that of subject-object which 
arises within the domain of perception. In an attempt to collapse this duality Merleau-
Ponty invokes embodiment as a methodological principle.
55
 Thus, according to Merleau-
Ponty, the body serves as a “setting in relation to the world,” and consciousness serves as 
the means by which the body projects itself in the world.
56
 In this way, the body cannot 
be understood as distinct from or in interaction with an opposed principle of mind. 
Embodied beings engage with the surrounding environment using all the body’s sensory 
system in such a way that every act of meaning making becomes a lived-out, rather than a 
thought-out experience. As Vivian Sobchack aptly notes, the objective body is “always 
also lived out subjectively as ‘my’ body, diacritically invested and active in making sense 
and meaning in and of the world.”
57
 In this sense Dasein can be thought of as an 
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 The relationship of body and object of perception indicates that visual 
engagement with the world takes place at the boundary between a body and its 
surroundings, described by Merleau-Ponty as flesh.
59
 Flesh is not a substance existing in-
between the body and the world, but should be understood in terms of function. As 
Merleau-Ponty points out, “The thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is 
constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an 
obstacle between them, it is their means of communication.”
60
 Flesh functions as a 
continuous bond, or fabric of experience, in which body and thing interconnect in the 
event of living-in-the-world.
61
 Merleau-Ponty attempts, with this conception of flesh, to 
create a relationship of connection between the body and the world so as to support his 
thesis of the indivisibility of subject and object. The two are not ontological opposites, as 
in the Cartesian model, but are subsumed within the same horizon because, ‘he who sees 
is of it (flesh) and is in it.’
62
 Merleau-Ponty’s thesis is aims at rejecting “the age-old 
assumption that puts the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the 
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world and the body in the seer as in a box.”
63
 Rather, as he states it, a mutual relating 
occurs in which body and world are co-constituted and the body acts as a “general power 
of inhabiting all the environments which the world contains.”
64
 
 The significance of Merleau-Ponty’s work to the study of spirituality arises out of 
an emphasis on the formative nature of human lived experiences. The co-constitutional 
relationship between subject and object, the mutual formative powers of the individual 
and the social, evidences the fact that they are inseparably connected prior to any act of 
objectification. Embodiment then becomes the methodological principle for collapsing 
the subject-object duality; likewise, physical-spiritual and body-soul dualisms can be 
collapsed using the same methodological principle of embodiment. The elements 
comprising these dualities should not be understood as distinct from one another, only 
interacting as opposed principles, but are inextricable, co-constitutional, and mutually 
formative and informative. Thus, the habits carried about in the body, habits originating 
in and arising out of lived experience in the world, both form and inform a sense of the 
self and its place in the world.  
 Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty all three bring formidable challenges to 
the disembodied and decontextualized subjectivity of Cartesian philosophy. Their 
emphasis on constructed and contextual knowledge requires thinking seriously about the 
body and its material embeddedness. The implications of such a move prove crucial, for 
subsequent developments spell out the presence of the body in social, political, moral, 
and spiritual life. Subsequently, by the last few decades of the twentieth century, the body 
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became the locus of social, religious, political, cultural and economic interest and has 
become the key site of social and political intervention.
65
 This renewed interest in and 
focus on the body has led the sociologist Bryan Turner to conclude that contemporary 
society is a “somatic society” in which political and personal issues are problematized 




The Somatic Turn 
 
 The scholarly attention given to the human body at the end of the twentieth 
century bordered on a cultural obsession. In the first edition of Peter Burke’s New 
Perspectives on Historical Writing, the historian Roy Porter describes the history of the 
body as an ignored and neglected topic.
67
 Porter accounts for the neglect of the body in 
terms of a deep seated disparagement of the somatic in western culture.
68
 Only a decade 
later, in the second edition of the book, Porter claims that body history has become the 
“historiographical dish of the day.”
69
 While Porter rightly identifies a significant increase 
in scholarly attention to the body, Roger Cooter points out, it was not primarily body 
history that captured the interest of scholars; rather, it was the notion of a historicized 
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 Following the work of Michel Foucault, who framed the body as non-reductive, 
non-essentialist and politically invested, the register of concern shifted away from a 
history of the body as such and towards a cultural history of the body as embedded in and 
conditioned by its material situation.  
 
Foucault and Somaticized Culture 
 
The turn to the body gained momentum following the work of Foucault, largely 
due to the influence Foucault’s work has had on feminist, race, and gay studies. Foucault 
draws awareness to the body as the site of political power struggles and, as culturally 
constituted, the subject of a cultural history. He further raises an awareness of the 
complex relationship existing between power and the human body. Modern power, in 
Foucault’s estimation, comes to be constituted through discursive practices operative in 
and upon the human body. This condition arises from the desire to learn from nature in 
order to dominate it and in so doing gain mastery over others, which becomes a key value 
of modernity.
71
 As a result, modernity witnesses a reordering of the relationship of 
culture and nature in which nature, including the body, becomes something to be 
controlled and disciplined.
72
 Just as nature becomes subjected to human control and 
exploitation, so too, human embodiment, emotions, and desires have been civilized by 
formal modes of conduct. 
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Foucault understands these power structures as both shaping and being shaped by 
bodily knowledge and practices.
73
 The body itself, according to Foucault, is shaped by “a 
great many distinct regimes.”
74
 Thus, the body becomes central in the play of power, 
according to Foucault, and power “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches 
their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning 
processes and everyday lives.”
75
 In Foucault’s estimation, the body cannot be reduced to 
a fixed essence; rather, identity and meaning are fashioned through the body or biological 
life itself. This non-reductive, non-essentialist, socially constructed view of the body 




Rationality and Sensuality 
 Following Foucault’s non-essentialist approach to the body, a world disgruntled 
with the inadequacy of rationality turns to sensuality for answers and, as such, 
modernity’s devaluing and suspicion of the sensual becomes the focus of postmodern 
scholarly critique. The modern priority of mind over body becomes a major source of 
contention for its neglect of the important role the body plays in making sense of the 
world. The modern separation of the physical body from knowledge—in which seeing 
gets conflated with knowing, such that, sight becomes the means for the transport of 
knowledge from the external world to the inner world of the mind—becomes a contested 
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notion. In the postmodern context persons are no longer conceived of as disembodied 
rationalist beings, since there can be no unmediated access to knowledge. The senses can 
no longer be denied a role in the act of sense making, for the entire person, body and 
mind, engages and experiences its world on a bodily level. Human persons acquire 
information through their bodies, as Constance Classen points out, seeing, touching, 
smelling and tasting are activities which “make sense” of the world.
77
 The senses provide 
an immediate connection to the world; they create a sense of intimacy and belonging that 
can never be achieved by a disembodied rationality. 
 The idea of the senses creating an intimacy and feeling of belonging to the world 
should not be viewed negatively however, for the bodily senses can open up the natural 
world to the sacred as a lived manifestation of God’s presence. The sacred is experienced 
through the sensate body as a gift from God, not a thought out and distant gift, but an 
immediately realizable and lived out gift. Sensing the sacred makes possible the presence 
of God while the traditional western tendency to deny the senses, to label them profane, 
removes the sacred from immediate reality.
78
 Modern Protestantism’s suspicion of the 
senses, and the bifurcating of the world into distinct categories of sacred and profane, 
undergirds modernity’s retreat from the sacred and promotion of purely cognitivist forms 
of knowing.  
It must be acknowledged, however, that Christianity’s longstanding suspicion of 
the bodily senses does have merit, for Scripture serves as a stern warning against the cult 
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of the sensual. The contemporary cultural obsession with the sensual body has given rise 
to unhealthy practices that both form and inform personal identity in ways that are 
counter to the purposes of God and in ways which impede and even degrade spiritual 
growth. Nevertheless, if the sensual body plays a role in spiritual formation, it cannot be 
ignored or neglected.  For this reason, it becomes imperative for the Church to gain a 


















THE BODY AND SPIRITUALITY: INTERIORITY AND PRACTICE 
 
 The previous chapter points out how responses to the autonomous and 
disembodied self of Descartes gives rise to a body centered non-reductive materialism. 
The spirit-body dichotomy and ambivalence toward the body in strands of Christian and 
modern thought neglect the important role of the body in understanding the world and 
one’s place in it. This bracketing off the body leaves religion to understand human beings 
as believing, disembodied minds, thus neglecting the influence and role of material 
conditions and practices.
1
 The materialist response provides an alternative to this 
disembodied internalism and idealism by shifting the focus back to the historicity, 
facticity, embodiedness, and embeddedness of everyday human existence as the 
inescapable conditions for the construction of selfhood and the making of meaning.
2
 
Returning the body to the center of discussions of spirituality, and considering the ways 
in which material conditions and bodily practices are both formative and informative, 
marks important features of this shift. It becomes important for the study of Christian 
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spirituality, therefore, to determine how the body and its role in constructing identity and 
making meaning are to be understood. Now that the material grounds for theorizing about 
spiritual formation have been established, it becomes possible to move forward in 
developing an understanding of the body sufficient to inform spirituality. 
 
Defining the Body in the Social Sciences 
 
Defining the body proves no easy task, for as any perusal of the literature 
demonstrates, the term appears polysemic. At its most basic level the word “body” 
denotes the physical flesh and can refer to what remains after a person dies. As Justo 
Gonzalez points out, “at a funeral we say that the body may be viewed, or the body lies in 
state.”
3
 Alternatively, the word can be used in an entirely different way to refer to the 
person, such as in the saying, “what is a body to do?”
4
 Bynum suggests that the term 
“body” has multiple referents and lacks a well-established understanding across academic 
disciplines.
5
 Lacking any set of established structures or behaviors, the term, at times, 
refers to biological or social limit or placement such as physical organs or gender, race, 
or class. At other times, however, it can refer to lack of limits such as desire, potentiality, 
or identity.
6
 McGuire points out that the body often gets defined reductively in terms of 
agency or matter.
7
 Agency, according to McGuire, refers to the socially constructed body 
as an active persona within society, so that loss of agency, by whatever means, implies an 
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assault upon the self. Matter, she notes, denotes the biological body which becomes the 
grounding for bodily experience in the world.
8
 McGuire seeks to avoid reductive models 
in her own work by reconceptualizing mind, body, and society as a deeply intertwined 
and interdependent set of phenomena.
9
 The complexity in defining the body indicates that 
any reductive definition will fall short of doing justice to its biological, social, cultural, 
phenomenological and spiritual dimensions and prove of little value in understanding the 
role of the body in spiritual formation. A much broader conception of embodiment proves 
necessary to understanding the important place the body occupies in all of these 
dimensions. 
 
The Multidimensional Body 
 
 Mark Johnson’s research on embodiment proves most helpful in identifying the 
complex and multidimensional functions of embodied experience. Johnson identifies five 
interwoven dimensions necessary to any definition of human embodiment.
10
 The most 
obvious understanding of the body derives from the commonsense fact that it exists as a 
“biological organism” composed of flesh and blood. As such, the body makes possible an 
orientation to the world since the world extends out from the body and is oriented in 
relation to the body. The various systems of the body working together, Johnson notes, 
“makes possible the qualities, images, feelings, emotions, and thought patterns that 
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constitute the ground of our meaning and understanding.”
11
 As a biological unit the body 
consists of multiple biological functions working together and therefore cannot be 
reduced to any single function. Nor, does the body exist in isolation, however, and as a 
functioning biological organism it interacts on several levels with its environment. Given 
the constitutive relationship between body and environment it proves impossible to 
reduce embodiment to mere biological function since the body is defined by and in 
relation to other things.  
The interrelation between organism and environment requires that the body also 
be conceived, Johnson suggests, as an “ecological body” incapable of existing 
independent of its environment. In this sense, the body and its environment are 
understood as co-constitutive; there can be no organism-environment duality, as though 
each brings its own pre-given structure and identity into the interaction.
12
 The meaning 
and identity of each become determined within the relational structures they both share. It 
quickly becomes evident, however, that the mutual formative functions of biological 
organism and external environment are not enough to exhaust the meaning of the body. 
More goes on within embodied existence than mere organism-environment interaction, 
for bodily being-in-the-world involves a series of complex reflections on experiences. 
 The reflexive awareness of daily lived bodily experiences defines, what Johnson 
labels, the “phenomenological body.” The phenomenological dimension describes the 
tactile and kinesthetic functions of embodiment; it describes the “living, moving, feeling, 
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pulsing body of our being-in-the-world.”
13
 This phenomenological aspect of embodiment 
marks the body’s awareness of itself through proprioception, the feeling of bodily posture 
and orientation, and through kinesthetic sensations of bodily movement.
14
 There becomes 
through this embodied experience, then, an awareness of internal bodily states in which 
feelings and emotions serve the constitutive function of creating a felt sense of self.
15
  
This felt sense of self does not take place in isolation, however, for the embodied 
person exists within social and cultural structures that together play a formative role in 
making meaning. Johnson refers to the “social body” in an effort to describe the inter-
subjective relationships and “coordinations” of experiences that together produce and 
express social meaning.
16
 Bodies develop within and through inter-personal relationships 
with others and these social relationships become crucial in forming the ways the bodily 
self gets understood and expressed. Likewise, Johnson describes the “cultural body” in 
terms of the ways bodies are constituted by shared “cultural artifacts, practices, 
institutions, rituals, and modes of interaction that transcend and shape any particular body 
and any particular bodily action.”
17
 Cultural institutions, practices, and values provide 
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shared structures that influence the development of bodily ways of engaging and making 
sense of the world.
18
  
The value of this contemporary research on the body and embodiment lay in its 
ability to account for the multidimensional structure of human existence. Each dimension 
constitutes an appropriate and irreducible level of explanation of embodied being-in-the-
world.
19
 This proves crucial to overcoming reductive conceptual understandings of the 
human person that alienate, neglect, or ignore certain dimensions of human existence and 
experience. Understanding embodiment as the quality of having and being intimately 
identified with the body in this multidimensional way opens the possibility of developing 
an approach to spiritual formation that takes serious each of these dimensions.
20
 The 
human endeavor to make sense of bodily and spiritual life simply cannot be reduced to a 
function of the mind, for as Johnson and others have demonstrated, the mind cannot be 
extricated from embodiment.                             
 
The Body and the Making of Meaning in the Social Sciences  
The cumulative research available from social and cultural anthropology, the 
cognitive sciences, the social sciences, and the social sciences of religion demonstrates 
that the knowledge the body has of its world gets transmitted primarily through critical 
apprenticeships, ritual practices, and bodily and spatial practices rather than through 
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 For example, bodily posture, ways of moving, spatial 
practices, ways of making things, and “practical taxonomies of sensory experience” are 
all forming and informing functions of embodied practice.
22
 In other words, 
apprenticeship and ritual practice are key ways the body makes sense of the world, they 
become means to reorient, correct, or rearrange the senses through habitual bodily 
practice.
23
 This research is promising for rediscovering ways to engage spiritual 
formation.  
Following the theoretical shift from structure to process and practice within the 
social sciences in recent decades, evangelical scholars are increasingly becoming aware 
of, even sensitized to, notions of embodied perception
24
 and bodily habitus.
25
 
Understanding the important ways in which spiritual life is constituted by bodily and 
spatial practices opens up opportunities to structure these practices into daily routines and 
worship services in ways that facilitate spiritual growth. The value of this research for 
Christian spiritual formation resides in its ability to reorient theology and praxis around 
the role of embodiment in spiritual formation. This necessitates, of course, an 
understanding of spirituality broad enough to be informed by bodily practice.  
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Rethinking Spirituality with the Social Sciences 
 
A few preliminary remarks are in order. The problems plaguing discussions of 
spirituality are both old and new. Long standing notions of spirituality as something 
entirely distinct from and entirely independent of physicality makes any understanding of 
the daily practice of spirituality impossible. More recent problems arise out of 
understandings of spirituality as something interior to the human person, private, and 
entirely individual. The term “spirituality” has been extricated of almost all its biblical 
meaning in the past few decades. It has come to refer in generic terms to self-
actualization and self-transcendence detached from any religious or biblical context. In 
this generic sense spirituality refers almost entirely to the activity of the human spirit and 
has all but lost any orientation to the influence of the Holy Spirit and the Church.
26
  
Furthermore, contemporary enthusiasm over spirituality reveals an affinity to 
modern consumerism in which individual taste takes precedence over communal 
meaning.
27
 In twentieth century consumer culture the term spirituality tends to refer more 
generally to the interior life which need share no connection whatsoever with institutional 
religion and can be spoken of in terms of “my” spirituality.
28
 Christian spirituality, 
however, if it is to be biblical must not fall prey to such problems; rather, it must focus 
full attention on the triune God revealed in Jesus Christ through the illuminating power of 
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the Holy Spirit. Christian spirituality must be reconnected to the New Testament concept 
of discipleship in which proclamation, service and community membership are key and 
indispensable elements.
29
 Further, the tendency to sever spirituality from bodily practice 
by stressing detachment, denial, and suspicion of the body and emotions must be avoided. 
Spirituality must be understood in terms of an active process involving material practices, 
rather than merely an abstract quality or mere capacity. 
 
Defining Spirituality for Embodied Life 
 
 It should first be acknowledged that in an anthropological sense, spirituality, like 
personality, marks a constitutive characteristic of the human person as such.
30
 In this 
sense, spirituality marks a real sphere of human existence and experience and should be 
treated as such. In a very practical sense, however, spirituality describes the everyday 
manner in which persons attend to their spiritual lives.
31
 While not attempting a 
theological anthropology, it must be stated nonetheless, that the human person viewed 
holistically is constituted of body and spirit. Searching for a useful definition of 
spirituality must involve both the anthropological reality and the practical necessity of 
nurturing and living out that reality. Here the work of Sandra Schneiders proves helpful, 
for Shneiders captures elements of both a theoretical and practical definition. 
Spirituality, according to Schnieders, describes the capacity of persons to 
transcend themselves in love and knowledge in a manner that reaches beyond themselves 
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in relation to others. In this anthropological sense, all humans are spiritual.
32
 More 
specifically, however, she describes Christian spirituality as a “developed relationality to 
self, others, world, and the Transcendent.”
33
 As such, spirituality comes to be understood 
in terms of an experience of lived reality, both active and passive, in which “conscious 
involvement in a project” is pursued.
34
 The emphasis on the active and passive 
dimensions of spirituality asserts that while spirituality must be engage in conscious 
human effort, it cannot be reduced to an act of the human spirit, but also involves the 
work of the Holy Spirit.  
The claim of “conscious involvement in a project” directs spiritual experience 
away from a temporal feeling of an encounter with the sublime, or other momentary 
epiphany like episodic events, and places it within an ongoing and coherent approach to 
life. The project then, according to Schneiders, involves living out a Christ-like life 
within the context of the Church through the power of the Holy Spirit.
35
 This life 
approach defines a practice of “life-integration” which becomes a holistic synthesis of 
ongoing growth and development pursued by consistent “self-transcendence toward 
ultimate value.”
36
 The horizon of ultimate value is the triune God revealed in the person 
of Christ. Living within this horizon of ultimate value requires relating in an appropriate 
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way to all of reality, thus relating to the whole of reality and to reality as a whole in a 
Christian manner comes to constitute Christian spirituality.
37
 
By employing the concepts of “integration” and “holistic” Schneiders intends to 
involve the whole person in the process; body and spirit, emotions and reason, as well as, 
the individual and social dimensions of human existence and experience. This integrated 
and holistic approach to the study of spirituality marks a major step in the right direction. 
The Christian spiritual tradition has often obscured the capacity to take seriously the 
formative influence of human embodiedness and emplacement, but unless the embodied, 
social, and political dimensions of spiritual experience are taken into account, the 
Church’s vision of the Christian life will be impoverished and inadequate.
38
 Drawing on 
the anthropological reality of human persons as constituted by body and spirit, and taking 
serious the necessity to nurture and live out that reality, Schneiders develops a definition 
of spirituality as a purposeful practice and process involving the whole person situated 
within particular social contexts. This definition of spirituality contests any notion of the 
spiritual life as purely private and interior. 
 
Spirituality and Interiority 
 
 The Christian spiritual tradition has often obscured the capacity to take seriously 
embodied, social, and political influences on spirituality in part due to a longstanding and 
pervasive emphasis on the interior life as distinct from the outer bodily and communal 
                                                          
37
 Schneiders, “The Study of Christian Spirituality,” 6. 
 
38
 Douglas Burton-Christie, “Introduction: Beginnings,” in Minding the Spirit: The Study of 
Christian Spirituality, ed. Elizabeth A. Dyer and Mark S. Borrows (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 




 This sentiment is summed up in a letter penned by Thomas Merton to a circle of 
friends shortly before his death, he wrote: “Our journey is interior; it is a matter of 
growth, deepening, and ever greater surrender to the creative action of love and grace in 
our hearts.”
40
 This common understanding of spirituality as an inner journey in the life of 
the soul continues to be prevalent and persuasive even today.
41
 It takes for granted that 
the term “spiritual” refers to a sphere of human existence distinct from the physical. As 
Sheldrake reminds us, however, the concept of spirituality comes from the Greek words 
pneuma and pneumatikos as used by the Apostle Paul to describe a way of life directed 
toward and by the Spirit, in contrast to living in ways opposed to the Spirit of God.
42
 
Rather than a private experience, such as individual devotional or ascetical exercise, 
spirituality refers to common everyday practices that mark out a way of life.
43
 
Reducing spirituality to a matter of private concern presents a problem, as Wade 
Clark Roof points out, for religion understood as external and institutional practice tends 
to be denigrated while spirituality understood as interior and private tends to be 
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 Religious institutions and traditions are no longer perceived as essential to the 
construction of a sense of self, or meaning more broadly, because the self and meaning 
are solely the marks of interiority. This sense of interiority as private and individual life 
would have been foreign to the earliest Christians, as Brown points out, for they inherited 
from Judaism an intense sense of solidarity between the individual and the community. 
There existed a perceived danger that retreat into privacy would undermine the promotion 
of the common good intended in the divine imperative to love and serve one’s neighbor. 
Thus Jewish writers focused on the thoughts of the heart as the core of motivation and 
intention purposively suggesting that an undivided heart is essential to communal 
solidarity.
45
 Spirituality as lived experience, therefore, understood in terms of practice or 
project, become inherently social and cannot be reduced to the personal private inner life 
distinct from and independent of embodiment, community, tradition, and political 
influences.
46
 A lived spirituality encompasses all of these spheres of existence in the act 
of constructing private and social meaning and solidarity. 
 Interiority becomes an issue in spirituality due to a longstanding and influential 
philosophical tradition which tends to divide reality into opposites and then prioritize one 
side over the other. This inner-outer dualism has its roots in the modern attempt to 
establish a unified self in which Descartes distinguishes mind from body and Locke 
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detaches consciousness from embodiment. The modern self becomes a product of the 
intellect disengaged and detached from bodies and social practices.
47
 Christianity has 
tended to adopt this view and take the “inner self” as the true self and the primary locus 
of God’s work in human lives. This view places the inner life and the bodily life in 
tension and prioritizes the inner over the outer, but Denys Turner notes, that while 
interiority has occupied a central role in descriptions of Christian spirituality, it really 
serves as more of a theological metaphor that a statement of human constitution.
48
  
Throughout its modern history Christianity has struggled to find some means of 
resolving this tension, often vacillating between the two positions, as Stephen Sykes 
notes, Christianity has both an “inwardness tradition” and “externality tradition” related 
dialectically and emphasis tends to oscillate between the two.
49
 There is a false dilemma 
here however, for there appears no need to insist on either/or, one tradition over the other, 
when a both/and response provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
construction of self and meaning. As the Catholic philosopher Charles Taylor makes 
clear, the self and its ideas can only be understood in the context of embodiment and 
practices.
50
 The deliberate analysis of the concept of “person” by the English philosopher 
P.F. Strawson makes the point even more conclusively, he insists that a person is “a type 
of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates 
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ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, are equally applicable to a single 
individual of that type.”
51
 Strawson concludes thus, “So the concept of the pure 
individual consciousness, the pure ego, is a concept that cannot exist.”
52
 In an attempt to 
emphasize the influence of embodiment and emplacement to the construction of self and 
meaning, Wittgenstein reverses the Cartesian order and makes externality, the body and 
its practices, primary to the inner life.
53
 Drawing from the work of Wittgenstein, the 
theologian Owen C. Thomas makes a similar argument claiming that the outer must be 
understood as the primary and major source of the inner.
54
  
 The need to collapse the dichotomy of inner and outer does not imply a denial of 
either one or the other; rather, to collapse the dichotomy means neither side receives 
priority over the other, but both are viewed as equally constitutive of the self. It is 
possible, then, to understand interiority in terms other than private introspection.
55
 
Interiority can be understood, Frohlich claims, as “that dimension or state of the human 
being capable of a living union between inner and outer, material and transcendent, 
communal and solitary, eternal and transient.”
56
 In this sense, interiority and innerness 
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are related affectively through “presence” or “communion” and manifested “in such 
forms as human love, intuitive knowing, or a sense of group solidarity.”
57
 
The medieval theological tradition, according to Schmitz, offers an understanding 
of interiority as the capacity for engagement and intimacy with God which involves the 
most profound depths of one’s being.
58
 Here the inner and outer engage in an intimate act 
of receiving the presence of the other. Interiority has the fundamental capacity for 
intimate engagement and self-transcendent communion with God which marks the 
capacity of the individual to become “a place-in-the-world where this God dwells.”
59
 
Thus, the embodied and embedded self becomes the locus of encounter and the site of 
God’s presence in the world. Interiority then, as Lonergan claims, refers to self-
appropriation rather than self-objectification.
60
 In self-appropriation intimacy precedes 
and grounds objectivity, thus grounding self-presence with what is other; rather than 
reifying its object, the self enjoys a living apprehension of the true being of the other. In 
this sense, interiority and exteriority are co-constitutive, as Jean-Louis Chrétien points 
out, “Even self-delight, should it occur, is but the mature blossom of an immeasurably 
saturated encounter.”
61
 Such an encounter is always more than mere private experience 
because it always necessitates the other, Chrétien continues, “I experience the joy of 
seeing, of touching, of hearing, or attentively exercising the diverse possibilities that are 
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mine always by seeing, touching, hearing something other than myself, out in the 
world.”
62
  Thus, interiority as self-appropriation, as opposed to self-objectification, opens 
again the distinction made by Jean-Luc Marion between an idol and an icon. An idol 
fixes the gaze upon itself while an icon guides the gaze toward infinite relatedness.
63
 
Private introspection makes of the self an idol while interiority makes of the self an icon 
through which the love and presence of God flows.
64
 Viewed in this way interiority does 
not take precedence over nor does it exclude the body and material conditions from 
spiritual experience, but instead describes the space in which God can be encountered. 
 
Practice and Spiritual Formation 
 
 If spirituality refers to the daily lived experiences by which the whole person 
come to serve as an icon of God’s love and presence, it necessarily entails a set of 
practices by which such a life is made possible. Spirituality and its concomitant formation 
refer to the daily living out—practicing—of life in the Spirit. The need for conceptual 
clarity in discussions of “practice” becomes evident with any cursory reading on the 
topic. Broadly stated, according to theologian Rebecca Chopp, practice refers to “socially 
shared forms of behavior that mediate between what are often called subjective and 
objective dimensions. A practice is a pattern of meaning and action that is both culturally 
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constructed and individually instantiated.”
65
 Thus, practice refers to shared activities that 
shape meaning, provide and orientation to the world, and guide actions.
66
 Practice in 
Christian spiritual formation, then, refers to the intentional and repeated actions and 
activities that orient daily life toward the divine and foster life in the Spirit.
67
 
 Intentional and repeated practice inscribes in the very bodies of practitioner—
through habituation—a bodily memory that makes a given response second nature.
68
 
Christian practice is discipline, but should not be reduced to or limited to the practice of 
specific spiritual disciplines; rather, practice as I am using the term refers to actions and 
activities that, engaged in daily in an intentional way, orient our world toward the divine 
in such a way as to produce Christ-like character. Spiritual formation then becomes the 
means by which people generate order and meaning in their lives and intentionally and 
repeated engage practices that direct and form their lives to be like Christ.  
 
The Body in Spiritual Practice 
 
 The search to connect with the spiritual life marks a search for the ultimate source 
of the self. The search to find the inner self defines an effort to determine meaning 
capable of transcending the temporal and changing structures of this world. The human 
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effort to ground the self, to make sense of the world, is always mediated through bodily 
existence and embodied experience however. The body, therefore, cannot be reduced to 
an object, to an “it” to be objectified and analyzed by an opposing mind; rather, the body 
always already plays a role in forming a sense of the self as it relates to and partners with 
others in the act of making meaning. Bodily existence, therefore, exerts an inescapable 
force upon thought and experience, such that, according to Merleau-Ponty, “by remaking 
contact with the body and the world, we shall rediscover ourselves.”
69
 The body precedes 
all reflection and like the world becomes, according to Merleau-Ponty, the “inalienable 
presence” that conditions all our knowing.
70
 The body becomes grounds for the condition 
of discovering the self. As living beings, humans encounter the world in the flesh, and 
within this encounter self-discovery becomes possible. Human beings are always situated 
bodily; situated in relation to others, God, immediate environment and the world.
71
 The 
body and embodied practices simply cannot be ignored. 
Essential to Christian spirituality, therefore, is the understanding that the body 
knows and makes sense of its world through a series of multidimensional relationships 
which include apprenticeships, ritual practices, and bodily and spatial practices. This fact 
suggests a real need, as Claire Wolfteich explains, for the church to engage in “the 
learning of deep, embodied, practices of spiritual wisdom which are real and organic to 
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our life contexts while also anchored in the traditions of Christian spirituality.”
72
 The 
implications of this for Christian spiritual practice involve the body as the site at which 
the fruit of God’s presence and power becomes most manifest to the world. By rethinking 
spirituality along these lines, spiritual formation becomes less about controlling the 
unruly body or subordinating it to the mind, and more about aligning the body with God’s 
purposes for it.
73
 Understanding how ordinary people are formed, how practices are 
learned, and how practices shape the self and make meaning allows for the development 
of spirituality for everyday life aimed at understanding, retrieving and shaping lives.
74
 
Spirituality viewed in this way holds promise for evangelical faith and practice, for it 
takes serious the everyday ways in which the body as the temple of the Holy Spirit 
participates in spiritual formation through habitual practices.  
Evangelicalism appears in the process of rediscovering the contributions a rich 
tapestry of bodily knowledge makes available to spiritual experience. The sensible and 
sensual dimensions of human experience and expression are increasingly being 
acknowledged for the formative influence they exert on human meaning making.
75
 
Renewed appreciations for the tactile, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive functions of 
perception, the way persons experience touch both on the surface of the flesh and inside 
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their bodies, now grips the evangelical imagination.
76
 The role of the material body in 
making meaning increasingly takes a more central role in evangelical discussions 
concerning spiritual practice. A return to the body becomes essential for two reasons: 
First, it becomes necessary to a robust and biblical understanding of spiritual formation. 
Second, it raises immediate awareness of the ways competing narratives can recruit by 
covertly conscripting bodies through routine daily practices.
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(DE)FORMING THE BODY: SUBVERSIVE STORIES THAT SHAPE LIVES  
  
The previous chapter discusses how the multidimensional functions of 
embodiment play an important role in constructing meaning and a felt sense of self. 
Always already immersed in an environment, persons acquire a practical orientation to 
the world through daily bodily involvement in it. The body plays an integral role in 
shaping both individual and communal conceptions of the world, as Merleau-Ponty so 
aptly notes, for the body serves as our general medium making possible a world.
1
 Identity 
formation and meaning-making can now be understood as more than mere cognitive 
functions, for knowing subjects are not detached, disembodied, neutral observes standing 
at a distance and mentally processing objective inputs. The self is always already 
embedded in a world as an active agent engaged with and in formative social structures. 
As such, practical involvement in the world precedes theoretical evaluation which means 
“understanding” and “making sense” takes place at the level of lived experience and not 
that of discourse.
2
 Taking this to be the case, spirituality and spiritual formation cannot be 
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reduced to the cognitive appropriation of a set of doctrinal truth claims, for spirituality 
involves lived experience.  
 
Subversive Stories That Solicit Bodies 
 
Spirituality as lived experience makes up one very important sphere of human 
existence necessary to a healthy sense of self, but spirituality is practiced in a world and 
lived out and defined in relation to other spheres of human existence. It proves 
impossible, therefore, to conceive of spirituality as capable of providing meaning to 
everyday life while remaining disconnected from the material practices that shape 
everyday human experience. Understanding spirituality requires attention to the material 
conditions which shape understanding through everyday formative practices. The 
common practice of conceptualizing and delineating spirituality over against materiality, 
insisting on either/or dichotomies of spiritual verses material and sacred verses profane, 
renders the natural world and its practices of little or no consequence to spiritual life. 
When the inner life delimits spirituality, it renders the everyday life of material practices 




Against such views of spirituality as disembodied and unencumbered by material 
influences, recent studies in the social sciences have shown the importance of 
embodiment to spiritual life. Nevertheless, the idea of spirituality as a private and inner 
journey remains influential in Evangelical practice, being primarily proliferated through 
stories subversive to true biblical spirituality and practices antithetical to the purposes of 
                                                          
3
 Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
1963), 12. 
83 
God. Neglecting the role of the body in the daily practices of spirituality leaves it 
vulnerable to conscription by and through practices intended to form individuals in ways 
contrary to Scripture. To understand contemporary attitudes towards the body and 
spirituality it might prove helpful to look at the ways in which both have been subverted 
for socio-political and economic purposes.   
 
(Re)storying Spirituality: Privatization and Commodification 
 
 Social institutions serve as the embodiment of tradition and institutional practices 
orient members to a certain way of being in the world. Until the Modern era, the 
centrality of sacred community and sacred tradition was embedded deeply in the fabric of 
society.
4
 Organized religion held a monopoly on symbolic frameworks and, although 
never complete, exercised considerable control over spiritual practice.
5
 Likewise, 
institutional religion monopolized certain goods instrumental in shaping meaning and 
forming identity; among them were a comprehensive world view, a social safety net, and 
a space for communal and associational life.
6
 Spiritual life was intimately intertwined 
with and indivisible of the life of the religious community and its concomitant tradition, 
thus there existed a strong formative tie between individuals and the institutions that 
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helped form their identity.
7
 Religious communities and traditions, therefore, occupied a 
central place in the narrative of human life, but the rise of the modern world precipitated 
changes that would eventually alter the story line of the relation between individual and 
institution. The causal factors motivating and precipitating the changes, whether 
primarily socio-economic or socio-political,
8
 do not interest this discussion; rather, the 
resultant severing of individual identity and values formation from institutional 
dependence and influence does interests us here.  
Religion exercised considerable control over spiritual meaning and practice 
throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century through a variety of institutional 
structures.
9
 This would all change, however, as religion became privatized and later 
spirituality individualized and interiorized. Here, the work of Jeremy Carrette and 
Richard King proves fruitful to this discussion.
10
 Carrette and King identify two phases in 
the privatization of religion: The first they identify as the “the individualization of 
religion” which begins in the Enlightenment and arises out of modern liberal political 
theory. This is followed thereafter by a second phase in the twentieth century which they 
identify as “the commodification of religion” which arises out of the spread of global 
corporate capitalism. Recasting the story of religion in terms of individualization and 
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privatization began in earnest then, according to Carrett and King, in the Enlightenment 
primarily through two movements: The separation of religion from the public sphere and 




Liberal Individualism and the Individualization of Religion 
 
Notions of the self are not novel creations of Enlightenment thought; rather, 
themes of inwardness, intentionality, self-expression, and self-examination have roots 
stretching back into the Middle Ages.
12
 Nevertheless, individualism gains ascendency in  
the changing political and cultural climates of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
with the rise of modernity, for it is there that the rigid status system characteristic of 
feudal society gives way to the market economy, industrialization, specialization, and 
urbanization.
13
 Responding to the displacement of a system in which social relations were 
based on custom and tradition, some European intellectuals turned to forms of social 
contract theory to explain how social relations between autonomous and free individuals 
could be formed. In contractual theory, social rules and structures are merely constructs 
governing social interaction, but have no constitutive effect on personal identity. Old 
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values of communal solidarity and conformity are replaced with new values focusing on 
individual freedom, detachment, personal self-interest and privacy.
14
 The core of this type 
of individualism Robert Bellah terms “ontological individualism,” for it holds that the 




While individualism as such may have roots extending back beyond the 
seventeenth century, the individualizing of religion, that is, relocating religion to the 
private sphere, has its roots in the fertile intellectual soil of Enlightenment thought where 
the underlying principles of liberalism challenged the traditional social and moral 
authority of the church.
16
 In the minds of many European intellectuals, avoiding the 
religious conflicts of previous centuries required liberating the framework of society and 
politics of its mooring in religious authority. Philosophers such as John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant proposed consigning religion to the private sphere in an effort to clearly 
demarcate it from the public sphere, thus preserving the secular space of liberal political 
governance from the conflicts of competing religious ideologies.
17
 To accomplish this, 
religion was recast primarily in terms of personal choice, beliefs, and private states of 
mind. Within the intellectual climate of the Enlightenment, the free autonomous rational 
agent appears, only now capable of discovering the world and forging identity free of the 
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constraints of external forces. In the philosophy of Kant, the autonomous and self-
existent individual becomes the sole ground for meaning in spiritual experience.
18
 Recast 
in this context, Carrette and King note, the relationship of individuals to religious 
communities “becomes a matter of personal assent to a set of beliefs, a matter of the 




Beginning in the Enlightenment, the social authority once given to religion gets 
transferred to scientific rationalism, humanism, and the democratic nation state—a 
process referred to as secularization.
20
 Religion increasingly lost direct contact with the 
realities of daily life as it was divested of the secular and confined solely to religious 
doctrine and practice.
21
 Religious institutions retained significance only in formal aspects 
such as “dedicating and sanctifying the crucial events of life such as birth or marriage or 
death.”
22
 Providing the space for autonomous rational agents to exercise freedoms to 
pursue self-chosen goals and private conceptions of the good life became the primary 
purpose of social institutions. Subsequently, liberal individualism recasts the story of 
communal tradition, no longer in terms of structuring or formative influence, but now in 
terms of an arena for the pursuit of individual self-determination in which institutions 
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exist only to provide the necessary order for making such self-determined activity 
possible.
23
 Severing the co-constitutive relationship between individuals and institutions 
in this way renders the institution a mere pragmatic necessity, useful only for purposes of 
promoting self-interest. In the same manner that individuals and institutions could be 
clearly demarcated by defining conceptual distinctions, so too could religion be 
demarcated from other spheres of human existence.  
 The Enlightenment preoccupation with determining the precise characteristics of 
religion gave rise to the misleading notion that conceptual distinctions were real features 
of the world, as opposed to culturally constructed ways of understanding religion. 
Demarcating spheres of existence by determining and defining conceptual distinctions 
may prove useful for analysis, but it neglects the co-constitutive relationship that exists 
between subjects and objects. “The attraction of defining an essence,” according to 
Carrette and King, “is that it clearly demarcates a field for the purpose of analysis.”
24
 
Making such a move, however, leaves the misleading impression that religion clearly 
does constitute a sphere of human existence divorced from the spheres of politics, 
economics, and culture.
25
 Recasting the story along these lines, of course, distorts the true 
nature of religion and spirituality. Neither religion nor spirituality exist independent of or 
unencumbered by the material conditions through which they acquire meaning; that is, 
they cannot be understood in isolation of the social, political, and economic world.  
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Psychology: Individualizing and Interiorizing Spirituality 
 
 The individualization of religion and the rise of the free autonomous rational self 
which took shape in the Enlightenment initiated an intellectual dialogue that would give 
rise to the interiorization of spirituality. The nineteenth century Romanticist response to 
Enlightenment rationalism found a voice in the introspective approach of the German 
theological tradition which would prove influential in the rise of psychology by the end 
of the century.
26
 In fact, Turner notes, that since the nineteenth century the Christian 
tradition has effectively psychologized the theological metaphor of interiority.
27
 
Nevertheless, notions of spirituality as interior, located in the modern individual self, 
arise with the development of psychology as a distinct discipline of human investigation 
and analysis.
28
 Not surprising since etymologically psychology is associated with the life 
of the soul which traditionally implies a focus on the interior life, thus psychology 
becomes the study of the life of the mind.
29
  
Striving for legitimacy as a disciple, psychology attempts to construct explanatory 
models based on the natural sciences in order to explain human experience. By mid 
twentieth century, Nikolas Rose suggests, these explanatory models of human experience 
come to be understood in terms of a range of institutions and powers determined within 
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the “psy” disciplines which claim authority over prior models of the self.
30
 According to 
Foucault, these networks and institutions create the subject through relations of power. 
He explains, “This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which 
categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize.”
31
 These new 
authoritative stories of the self both subvert and supplant older narratives of the self 
which were grounded in philosophical imagination and religious introspection.
32
 
Promising to provide a more scientific explanation of the self, a sense of self 
grounded in objective science, the new psychological paradigm shifts the very conditions 
for thinking about modern subjectivity itself. Psychology, touted as an objective science, 
becomes the new interpretive structure for understanding human experience and forming 
personal identity.
33
 Forms of the self which arise from within the new psychological 
paradigm, as Carrett and King indicate, “Constantly inscribe the language of private self 
and private possessions and actively subvert awareness of relational and social 
identity.”
34
 Assumed as a given, the modern autonomous self serves as a basic 
philosophical presupposition governing the way research into human experience gets 
conducted. As Carrett and King further note, “Psychology carries this private and 
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individualized self into its methods and measurements, a philosophical assumption that 
becomes a precondition of experimentation. It seeks to calculate and mark out a self for 




Capitalism, Psychology and the Commodification of Religion 
 
The engagement of psychology with religion has meant a reconfiguration of 
religion in terms of the psychological self, thus removing the social dimension of religion 
and creating a spirituality of the self.
36
 When this happens, Carrett and King note, “The 
internal economy of the self is set above the external economy of social relations.”
37
 
Spirituality becomes a marketable commodity shaped to individual desires and produced 
according to consumer demand, created and driven by market forces, and manipulated by 
political and economic powers. Psychology provides the vehicle for these market forces 
to transport religion through the language of spirituality without politically threatening 
the status quo. In effect, as Carrett and King claim, “The territorial takeover of religion 




With the integration of psychology and religion a new religion of the self 
emerges, its effectiveness derived from allegiance to the free market of individual 
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 Private forms of spirituality integrate well in a consumer culture in which 
consumer choice reinforces the idea of a free autonomous subject. Meaning and identity, 
cut free of social and institutional moorings, become commodities to be purchased in an 
economy of exchange. The interiorization and commodification of spirituality has its 
roots in the engagement of religion and psychology in the late nineteenth century, but 
interiorization was made popular, according to Carrett and King, in the 1950s and 1960s 
with the rise of Humanistic Psychology and professional counselling. Recast in terms of a 
private and psychological phenomenon, spirituality then experiences a second major shift 
in the 1980s where, according to Carrett and King, the individualization of religion—
“involving the creation of individual, consumer oriented spiritualities”—begins to 
overlap with an increasing emphasis upon the commodification of religion described in 
terms of “the tailoring of spiritual teachings to the demands of the economy and of 
individual self-expression to business success.”
40
 The interiorization and 
commodification of spirituality and the engagement of spirituality with psychology have 
given rise to a therapeutic culture in which the therapist has replaced the prophet. 
 
Therapeutic Culture and Spiritual Formation 
 
In addition to the forces of consumer capitalism which deny any authority beyond 
the individual, the Church must reckon with the pervasive influence of the therapeutic 
culture. It would be naive to believe there are no power interests at work in therapy for, as 
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David Fitch states, “Therapy is spiritual formation of a suspicious kind. It is the formative 
religion of democratic capitalism.”
41
 Therapists reinterpret a person’s life according to a 
particular theory of the self. There are no neutral positions or value free theories, as 
Habermas points out, the therapist occupies a position of power, imposes a prestructured 
story line upon the patient, and re-narrates a life according to a particular school of 
psychological thought.
42
 And Foucault convincingly argues, the modern “technology of 
the self” arising out of the psychological disciplines turns the therapist into a pervasive 
force in structuring identity—the psychiatrist becomes the “master of truth.”
43
  
These alternative narratives are often dangerously and covertly subversive to true 
biblical spirituality, for since Christians are immersed in these stories daily, they are 
seductively formed and transformed by them in particular ways, and oriented by them to 
certain ways of being in the world. The Christian becomes a recruit to a particular way of 
understanding the world by the conscription of the body through formative practices. 
Nowhere is this more damaging to Christian formation than in a consumer culture bent on 
catering to self-comfort and self-consumption. Capitalist societies train people, through 
sensual appeal and bodily practice, to think of things in terms of commodities to be 
consumed according to individual consumer preference—including religious 
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 Religion, spirituality, and God come to be understood in instrumental 
terms, they become merely means to the end of individual desires.
45
 Rather than 
understanding human desire as a longing only satisfied by responding to the transforming 
call of God, a call which comes from beyond the self and elicits a move beyond the self, 
desires signify the need to dive deeper into self and engage new levels of consumption.  
 
Consumer Impulses: Conscripting the Body 
 
 Actions performed in the material body mater, for our sense of self does not float 
unencumbered from material conditions. Cultural and personal identity are not 
permanently fixed pillars, they are malleable and mutable, subject to manipulation and 
exploitation. Daily people engage in bodily routines and practices imposed by market 
economies and social structures that form and establish identity and values so covertly 
that it goes unrecognized by many.
46
 Social bodies and networks devoid of any true sense 
of biblical spirituality establish practices that imbed their own values deep in the bodies 
of individual participants. The body becomes the primary site for this kind of social 
construction, as Reischer and Koo point out, “The anthropological record amply 
demonstrates, bodies have been and continue to be reshaped in a myriad of culturally 
relevant ways.”
47
 Within the social realm the body marks the site of contest and control, 
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it becomes a “template and tool,” a potent symbol of core social values, thus the body 




Markets, Consumer Behavior, Trademarks and Mimetic Practice 
 
Pierre Bourdieu has convincingly demonstrates how “structuring dispositions” 
constituted in the practices of social bodies inscribe themselves in the bodies of 
individuals.
49
 These “structuring dispositions” serve to constitute the world in certain 
ways through the routine daily practices they impose.
50
 The body becomes the site of 
imposition for these structuring practices since the daily material actions that constitute 
them are performed in the body. The formative practices of the social body are necessary 
for perceiving a world, but the social body requires the bodies of individuals in which to 
instantiate its values and practices.
51
 The body, therefore, acting as a medium of 
representation, either becomes an icon of social values or the mechanism of social power 
and control.
52
 Within the contemporary social, political, and economic milieu, the body 
as an icon of social values does not point beyond itself to the God who creates and 
sustains all bodies; rather it points to the values of the market economy and consumer 
choice. Thus, within the culture of contemporary late-capitalism, Terence Turner notes, 
the body becomes the “object of seduction by advertising” and the object of 
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“interpellation by semiotically loaded commodities.”
53
 Within commercial spheres of 
exchange, then, the market becomes a powerful influence exploiting the body as a 
mechanism of power and control.  
The market influences identity and establishes values through means of imitation 
and contact.
54
 Marketing strategies create consumer sympathy for a product by means of 
imitation or mimicry. Consumer identity is formed through mimetic function—getting 
ahold of something by means of copying or imitation—and sensuous connection between 
the body of the perceiver and the thing perceived.
55
 Trademarks serve this purpose, for 
the mark “operates as a signature of authenticity” and it “registers real contact,” thus 
marking a moment of imprinting—branding.
56
 In mass mediated consumer societies the 
trademark or brand organizes the “magic of the mimetic faculty.”
57
 By means of mimicry 
the body becomes a vehicle for the expression of a “commercial surrogate identity” 
appropriated under the trademark, thus becoming a means of transport for the promotion 
and proliferation of core social values.
58
 So pervasive are these social, political and 
economic influences, so vast their reach that everyday life becomes an immersion in 
formative practices imposed by them.  
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Developing an effective approach to the formation of biblical spirituality entails 
an understanding of the ways in which other imposing influences present counter 
formative practices antithetical to God’s purposes. Too often the Church blindly 
embraces the tactics of corporate marketing, assuming as its desired end to attract new 
consumers in the market for religious goods and services. Catering to market practices 
has turned Christianity into a brand, a trademark, identifying a certain type of religious 
consumption. This strategy, however, only further forms and conforms to consumer 
practices that establish through habituation deep seated market values and consumer 
identity, thus forming the consumer in ways counter to and antithetical to true biblical 
spirituality. That people are daily being immersed in practices that influence and form 
them in ways contrary to Christian values should be cause for concern and careful 
reflection on the part of the Church. The recent obsession with all things sensual has lead 
to misunderstandings, misuses and abuses of the body, for sensuality divorced from a 
biblical spirituality and the guiding influence of the Holy Spirit becomes a tool used in 
the pursuit of illegitimate human desires.  
  
Somatic Culture and Sensual Obsession 
 
 Contemporary consumer culture has done much to foster the current obsession 
with all things sensual, for it takes the body as the locus of all the enjoyments, sensations 
and pleasures available for consumption. For consumer culture the good life is no longer 
something to be cultivated through development of certain virtues, but becomes a 
98 
consumer commodity which can be purchased.
59
 A new relationship obtains between 
bodies and selves, in which a new conception of self emerges with a much greater 
emphasis on appearance, performance, and control and management of impressions.
60
 
Concern for character with its emphasis on the virtues of honor, integrity, industry, thrift, 
and temperance gets replaced by a concern for personality with its emphasis on 
appearance, likeableness, creativity, and charm.
61
 In this new milieu, according to Warren 




 Indeed, following Foucault’s discussion of self-invention, the focus of attention 
moves away from authenticity and consistency in the overall structuring of identity 
towards the idea of invention and discontinuity in the quest for new ways to live.
63
 The 
primary tenets in the agenda of contemporary consumer culture are new experiences, 
sensations, and appearances, and the body marks the locus of such experiences, 
sensations, and appearances. Changes to the body are no longer dependent solely on 
natural physiological processes; no longer can the body be understood in terms of mere 
biological fact, for it has been transformed into a project. 
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 The basic presupposition underlying the agenda of the body as a project in late 
capitalist culture is the body’s malleability and flexibility.
64
 Belief in the malleability of 
the body has prompted Anthony Giddens to claim, “We have become responsible for the 
design of our own bodies.”
65
 Philip Hancock notes that the celebrity Cher once quipped 
in an interview with the Glasgow Evening Times: “Nature is not always the best. I have 
the money to improve on nature and I do not see why I should not.”
66
 Cher’s comment 
captures the widespread attitude that the body serves as a lifestyle accessory or symbol of 
status and, as Featherstone points out, because of the body’s plasticity it has become a 
thing to be stylized through shaping and sculpting.
67
 The body conceived as a project, 
because of its malleability, becomes a question of lifestyle choice and identity. The body 
can be shaped and sculpted through diet, exercise, or cosmetic surgery and it can be 
stylized through cosmetics, clothing, piercing, or tattooing.
68
 This cultural obsession with 
the body, evident in the cultural fascination with bodily appearance, status, and sensual 
pleasures, exposes an unhealthy narcissism antithetical to spiritual growth. The problem 
lay not so much in the sensual bodily appetites as such, but in the mistaken assumption 
that the locus of true and meaningful transformation is the body. 
                                                          
64
 See Hancock, The Body, Culture and Society, 3. See also Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1994). For a discussion of the body as project, see Anthony Giddens, Modernity 
and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). 
 
65
 Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity, 102. 
 
66
 Hancock, The Body, Culture and Society, 3. 
 
67
 See Featherstone, “Body, Image and Affect in Consumer Culture,” 200-207.   
 
68
 See Mike Featherstone, “The Body in Consumer Culture,” Theory, Culture, Society 1:18 
(1982); also see Hancock, The Body, Culture and Society; Featherstone, “Body, Image and Affect in 
Consumer Culture.” 
100 
 When personal identity, self-worth, and meaning are understood reductively in 
terms of bodily project or performance, constituted as it were through status and 
appearance, bodily transformation becomes of primary importance. The body must look 
and feel a certain way, portray a certain status and perform at a certain level in order to 
achieve the desired sense of identity and worth. Thus, marketers are continually extolling 
the positive benefits of bodily transformative work.
69
 There should, nevertheless, be no 
misunderstanding here, for bodily maintenance and transformation are not bad things in 
themselves. What must not go unnoticed, however, is the ways in which such embodied 
practices, when wrongly directed, make the body an end in itself rather than 
understanding the body’s importance in cultivating spirituality.  
The idea of bodily transformation is not new however; it has long been a standard 
feature of western culture with roots in early Christianity. Although, in the early Christian 
tradition, the notion of transformation originates with a divine calling in which response 
to the call involves the whole person in the transformative act of fashioning one’s life to 
serve God. The spiritual life aims at the appropriate ordering of one’s whole life in 
response to the call of God. The whole person, including bodily senses, emotions, and 
appetites are essential to cultivating the spiritual life. Bodies are important, but not as 
ends in themselves, rather always as a means for discerning and responding to God’s 
purpose for bodies. A truly biblical spirituality seeks to ground identity in the being of 
God; it should permeate every sphere of daily human existence. Rooted in corporeal 
existence, biblical spirituality stands opposed to all formative structures with purposes 
antithetical to Christ-like character formation. 
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(RE)CONCIEVING THE BODY FOR SPIRITUAL FORMATION: 









(RE)FORMING THE BODY: EMBODIMENT AND THE BIBLICAL STORY 
 
 The warning of the previous chapter makes explicit how alternative narratives 
often co-opt Christian spirituality by conscripting the body through daily formative 
practices. Unwittingly the Christian acquires an orientation to the world through 
narratives and practices aimed at forming individuals according to corporate capitalist 
interests. This unwitting conscription of the body through daily routines and practices 
becomes possible through the deep seated belief that “knowing” and “doing” are 
completely separate functions—that identity and meaning are products of the individual 
mind entirely independent of bodily actions. Couple this belief with the mistaken notions 
that Christianity can be reduced to the individual cognitive appropriation of a body of 
doctrine and spirituality reduced to a private inner journey, and institutional religion 
becomes all about the mind and heart—the significance of bodily practice gets neglected. 
This condition finds confirmation in the firm conviction that institutions function solely 
to provide a space and order for the pursuit of self-interest and self-expression—a 
condition in which institutional religion comes to be understood as serving the interest of 
individuals seeking to express their own private spirituality.  
103 
 Developing an engaged and embodied spirituality, grounded in and informed by 
the narrative texts of Scripture, becomes a necessary condition for an effective resistance 
to the subversive narratives and practices operative in the world. In this chapter I will 
attempt to demonstrate the important role of the body in biblical spirituality and offer it 
as a means to resist the cooption of the body by alternative interests. 
 
Biblical Spirituality and Embodiment: Call, Response, and Resistance 
 
Resisting the individualist, consumerist, and capitalist cooption of spirituality 
requires an engaged spirituality informed by the narrative texts of Scripture and the 
religious practices of the believing community. Developing such a spirituality can begin 
by returning to the Hebraic tradition in which knowledge and identity begin within the 
dynamic relationship of call and response. Beginning with the call requires a return to 
language as the means by which beings can break forth into presence—the call of God 
becomes the ultimate source of presence. Taking the call of God as originary means 
existence arises out of a listening in which the proper response is a welcoming and 
receptivity of the call. Spirituality is lived out within this dynamic relationship of call and 
response in which obedience and fidelity become the grounds for proper knowledge and 
identity. This becomes most evident in the incarnation in which the embodied Christ 
serves as the exemplary model of obedience and fidelity, thus providing the ultimate 







The Call: Language and Presence  
  
 Biblical spirituality never originates in the self, never arises as a response to some 
private inner feeling, it can never be disembodied thought cut free of its moorings in 
tradition, and this is precisely where it diverges from much contemporary spirituality. 
Thought can never be uprooted from its historicity as though not always already 
immersed in a dialogue with traditions that shape it and give it its “idiomatic tongue.”
1
 
Christian thought remains indebted to and in dialogue with a Jewish tradition that has in 
various ways and to various degrees shaped it and influenced its very language. Any 
discourse on Christian spirituality will be made richer by returning to the central motif 
around which the Hebraic experience of language gets organized, for here language is 
understood as the occasion of all being—for language makes presence possible. 
Language in its highest order, as word of God, constitutes a call, and when assimilated 
into the human world gets “structured by the modalities of reception and response.”
2
 The 
word, in the biblical narrative, “is never simply a word, nor a word about, but always 
already a word to.”
3
 The word, as divine address, accompanies every coming into 
presence and constitutes, in André Neher’s expression, its “rhythm.”
4
 Biblical existence 
begins in divine address, “And God said” (Genesis 1), thus humanity finds itself 
confronted by a determinate comprehension of a divine call, and within the reflexive 
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movement of call and response is played out the opening of presence as revelation. “All 
revelation,” Buber reminds us, “is a calling and a mission.”
5
 
 Biblical existence originates in a call, always already persons are summoned by a 
call which comes from beyond the self, and solicits a response to move beyond the self. 
God reveals himself in the call, in the divine solicitation, and humans discover 
themselves and all existence as being summoned.
6
 Divine revelation, then, can never be 
simply the manifestation of God in a saying, thus it can never be reduced to mere 
cognitive appropriation of content; rather, revelation has meaning only as encounter. In 
calling God reveals, but that which is received can never be reduced to mere cognitive 
content, for it is always already a presence.
7
 All life revolves around this rhythmic 
movement of solicitation and response, encounter and revelation, according to Buber, but 
not revelation as propositional dogma—not an “I know” or “I believe”—but around an 
encounter which carries with it an imperative call: “Hear, O Israel” (Deuteronomy 6:4).
8
 
The divine command to “hear” never comes incidentally, for it implies a prior call—a 
call which has already come, always already awaiting an awakening to it and 
acknowledging of it—but awakening to and acknowledging of the call necessitates a 
listening. That the call comes first, always already awaiting our response, implies that in 
the Bible human existence begins with listening, not only, or even necessarily, a listening 
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to words—not essentially a vocalization—but listening as an intimate awareness that the 
divine call lays claim to us, body and soul.
9
  
 Again, by returning to embodiment as a methodological principle for collapsing 
dichotomies it becomes possible to collapse the sight-hearing dichotomy between Greek 
and Hebraic thought so popularized by Bultmann and others. Following Jean-Louis 
Chrétien, it might be argued that the various powers of the call are never addressed to a 
disembodied mind, but to the whole human person which implies a connection between 
voice and senses.
10
 Recall, the essential difference between the two traditions can be 
traced to a divergent emphasis of accents from the Hebraic priority of the auditory 
(listening and therefore obedience) and the Greek priority of the visual (seeing and 
thereby discerning). But what happens to the dichotomy, Chrétien asks, “if the visible 
itself, through beauty, calls us and speaks to us?”
11
 In such instances, the “eye listens” 
becoming intimately aware of the call, the inaudible voice can be visually discerned, thus 
the audible voice cannot be the only voice.
12
 The call can be sensual and alluring, 




To begin with the call from beyond the self, to define the self in terms of listening 
and obedience, to involve the entire body in the acquisition of knowledge, and to situate 
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spirituality within the encounter of call and response, means knowing and doing conjoin. 
Knowledge becomes the product of receiving and welcoming the Other revealed through 
an encounter which comes first as a call. In this sense, knowledge cannot be understood 
as individual cognitive appropriation, in which case it would take God as its object. “The 
encounter with God does not come to man,” Buber proclaims, “in order that he may 
henceforth attend to God, but in order that he may prove its meaning in action in the 
world.”
14
 The claim Buber makes calls for careful consideration, for the encounter with 
God does not come in order that humans may turn God into an object of investigation and 
appropriation, merely cognize the meaning of the encounter; rather, the encounter with 
God comes so that the meaning of the encounter may be lived out faithfully in the world. 
In the encounter, knowledge arises out of an experience taking the form of “receptive 
sympathy” and in this sense expresses itself in the form of fidelity.
15
 This is not fidelity to 
a thought, nor to content, but to a presence—fidelity as a response to an encounter, to a 
call. 
 
The Response: Montage and Mimesis 
 
The encounter can never be reduced to a mere cognitive experience, for it 
involves the whole person including the material conditions which give space and shape 
to the experience. The call comes to embodied beings, to which the proper response is 
always a living out the meaning of the encounter through action in the world. In other 
words, the real meaning of the encounter becomes determined within the practice, for this 
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becomes the necessary condition for relationship. Otherwise, knowledge makes of its 
subject matter nothing more than an object of appropriation. Making sense of the 
encounter, then, requires inquiring more deeply into the ways in which the body and 
material conditions together play a role in interpreting and shaping the meaning of 
experience. Here a brief return to recent work in the social sciences may prove helpful. 
The social sciences over the past few decades have witnessed a shift in conceptual 
approaches to the body in an attempt to overcome the longstanding separation of 
knowledge and practice.
16
 Conceptualizations of the body as a “template for social 
organization” or as a biologically based structure separate from and independent of the 
mind have given way to interpretations of the body in terms of a multiplicity of complex 
and dynamic relations.
17
 Understandings of the body, of the self, and of making sense of 
the world in general, take shape within a network of complex and complicated relations 
which necessarily involves multiple and fluid contexts. Past tendencies in the social 
sciences to reduce the source of knowledge to a pre-defined context no longer proves 
convincing, for contexts involve the dynamic interplay of relations among things. As 
Taussig notes, “context” is not a “secure epistemic nest in which our knowledge eggs are 
to be safely hatched.”
18
 In such a case, self and other are intertwined in a complex of 
relations in which both are explicitly implicated and constituted in a juxtaposition of 
dissimilarity and sameness which might be explained and examined in terms of montage, 
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 Montage, as I am using the term, refers to a reflexive operation 
arising from a disruption in the monological storyline which occurs when one is faced 
with alterity.
20
 It speaks to the disorder that arises from within the interplay of sameness 
and difference which implicates both self and other in an act of co-constitution. Montage 
describes the reflexive response to disruptions of the orderly narrative by a counter 
narrative which always alters in some sense and to some degree the sense of self. An 
encounter between self and other, between self and God, opens the space for this 
reflexive operation to occur. 
Spirituality involves identity, a proper understanding of one’s self in relation to 
God, others, and the world, and it involves meaning, a felt sense of ultimate value and 
purpose which transcends one’s self. This comes about only when one stands face to face 
with the Other (the call), through montage; a disruption breaks the monologue and forces 
dialogue (the response) thereby bringing about self-discovery. Embodied identity arises 
out of these disruptive and reflexive encounters mediated through material bodies. The 
natural world marks the locus of these encounters and, as such, human dependency upon 
the natural world intends to elicit awareness of and communication with God as its 
ultimate source. The spiritual life, therefore, should not be understood as an escape from 
the body or the world; rather, as Schmemann suggests, spirituality “is the arrival at a 
vantage point from which we can see more deeply into the reality of the world.”
21
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Within the disruptive encounters with God, meaning and sense-making takes 
place, self-discovery occurs, and the spiritual world opens up to the material world. This 
vantage point opens within the encounter, within an openness to the encounter, in which 
self and other engage in a co-constitutive act of embracing and being embraced or of 
rejecting and being rejected. The encounter opens the space for montage, mimesis and 
alterity by forcing a choice of “being like” or “remaining different.” Mimesis becomes 
the means by which the material world and its practices can be structured by or related to 
ultimate reality. The mimetic relationship between art and nature which describes the 
human ability to produce similarities
22
 can also be recognized in the ritual performances 
of religion. Mimesis provides a way of understanding material practices as formative 
practices, thereby opening up the mutually informing interplay between material and 
spiritual realities. These ideas can be applied to Old Testament narrative accounts of the 
flesh, for within the disruptive encounters with both God and others the flesh 
materializes. 
 
Genesis: Encountering Flesh 
 
The biblical story of the genesis of humanity begins in an intimate intertwining of 
material relations and divine insufflation in which the word basar (flesh) is used to 
describe the material product of God’s act of creating and relating. Indeed, creating and 
relating are determined in the same act of calling, for the very essence of creating and 
relating can be deciphered through linguistic relations.
23
 The call that brings beings into 
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presence, that summons them to be at all, also brings them to be in relation. The linguistic 
injunction to be, and to be in relation, constructs the narrative flow of creation. The 
linguistic relation plays off a common root word. The clearest example of this is the 
creation of the first human (Genesis 2:7). Adam (adam) has his genesis from the pre-
existing material of the earth and stands in linguistic relation to the earth (adamah).
24
 
Likewise, the narrative presents the woman (isha) as constituted from the man (ish), she 
not only shares a material relation with the man—having been taken from his rib or 
side—she shares a linguistic relation in that they share a common linguistic root (Genesis 
2:22). Consequently they become one flesh.
25
 
When the text presents the first human as formed from the dust of the earth, it 
reveals the linguistic and material relations, but what exists is merely material—flesh 
(basar) in the sense of tissue or muscle.
26
 As the text intends to imply, however, 
materiality is a necessary but insufficient condition for living being, for ending the story 
here leaves the first human nothing more than inanimate clay. Life requires something 
more than mere matter. The very source of the man’s being, the means of animate life, is 
the breath of God—flesh encounters divine breath. The insufflation of the breath of life 
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makes the inanimate clay a living being.
27
 Enlivened by the divine breath the man 
becomes nephesh (animated flesh), although often translated as soul, Carr points out, 
nephesh refers just as much to the body’s vitality and intellect.
28
 According to the 
Genesis narrative of creation, then, the human person cannot be so cleanly separated into 
a material body and nonmaterial intellect or soul. A material body enlivened by one 
divine power constitutes the human person.
29
 
The living body of flesh, “the mud and the breath”
30
 defines a relationship to God 
whose very breath it shares. God forms the first human out of the fertile soil of the earth. 
Created from the fertile soil, however, connotes nothing negative, for it reflects 
humanity’s material relation and original connectedness to the earth and destiny to work 
it (Genesis 2:15).
31
 Here is man situated in a world, related to God and beast, yet 
remaining incomplete. There must have been some knowledge of self, no doubt, but in 
the disruptive encounters with God and animals, Adam only experienced radical 
dissimilarity. Adam’s naming the beasts (Genesis 2:19) made manifest the meaning and 
value God gave each kind, thus implying knowledge of their place and function in the 
created order, but no other created thing occupied the same place or shared the same 
function, Adam experienced only difference, so God created a partner. 
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In creating Eve, God made a space for an intimate kinship to exist in the bodily 
relationship between the man and the woman. When Adam first speaks of the woman, 
though he does not yet know her, he declares her “flesh from my flesh” (Genesis 2:23). 
Adam sees the woman in her nakedness, as Cooper points out, “He sees her as her 
body.”
32
 While similar, she is different from him. While originating from the self, she is 
other than him. While from him, she comes as God’s gift for him.
33
 Another rupture 
occurs in the storyline of Adam’s life in which the self comes to know itself only through 
another who is other. As Cooper notes, “His recognition of her as another arises as 
nothing less than his own self-discovery.”
34
 Through another, who is other, the man 
discovers his place and function in the world. The two share in a common flesh. Here the 
term “flesh of flesh” refers to something more than tissue or muscle; it refers to a 
relationship mediated through the body in which self and other are co-constitutive. As a 
complex of relations the body serves as a means to identity, but only within these 
relationships can a sense of self be achieved.  
The narrative account in Genesis 2 offers a unique perspective on this 
relationship, as Westermann points out, for among the creation myths of the Ancient 
Near East only the biblical account recognizes human existence as a partnership of man 
and woman.
35
 Creation of this partnership not only responds to the problem of loneliness, 
but provides a helper in the work of the garden (Genesis 2:18). Thus, the first two 
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humans are two things simultaneously, “workers and lovers.”
36
 There appears a 
progression in self-discovery evident in the narrative, as Cooper notes, “First there was 
simple flesh. Then there was flesh from flesh. Now there is one flesh.”
37
 Flesh comes to 
identify and describe a special relationship mediated in and through material bodies.
38
 
Such a relationship gives rise to a subjective spiritual unity whereby the sharing of 
deepest vocations and purposes become sacred and joyful. Material actions, therefore, 
give rise to spiritual reality. 
 
Leviticus: Sanctifying the Flesh 
 
 The creation story of Genesis 2 marks moments of human epiphany in which the 
relational character of God and humans are revealed. The narrative account of creation 
reveals the disruptive encounters that give rise to human self-discovery in which 
function, place, vocation, and purpose relative to these relations are determined. Every 
encounter of a personal narrative with the foreign narrative of another reveals something 
more about the human self in relation to the other. In the disruptive encounter with God, 
in that moment of human self-discovery in the face of the total otherness of God, the 
intrinsic holiness of God stands in stark contrast to the human condition. Holy in person 
and character, God stands apart as absolute Other. God’s holiness is communicated in 
every act of divine solicitation; therefore, in order for God’s presence to be a source of 
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grace and blessing, those who welcome the call with “Here I am” (Genesis 22:1; Exodus 
3:4)
39
 and wish to dwell with God must also be holy.
40
    
 The Levitical prescription governing the ritual processes of purification and 
sanctification intends to bring about the conditions necessary for personal contact with 
the divine. As Cooper notes, “The relative effects of personal contact with God’s holiness 
always depend on the relative moral and ritual state of the subject.”
41
 Seeking the 
nearness of God, therefore, Jonathan Magonet claims, entails “a life regulated, conducted 
and defined within a particular framework of practices, rituals and actions.”
42
 Nearness to 
God can only have beneficial effect if the subject seeking nearness becomes holy. The 
subject’s holiness, however, can only be determined by reference to God’s person and 
communicative acts. The central command of the Levitical prescription evidences this 
fact when it declares: “You must distinguish between the holy and the common, between 
the unclean and the clean (Leviticus 10:10).
43
 The purifying and sanctifying process 
involves both material bodies and material conditions. 
 The word common as a descriptive term refers to anything natural in the world 
and includes both objects and people. Identifying a thing as common simply describes its 
normal state of being within the created order. Cooper notes that common things can be 
either clean or unclean according to their relative state of purity.
44
 Things can be common 
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and unclean, or common and clean, but never common and holy. To be holy means to be 
set apart from the realm of the common and this can only be achieved through the ritual 
process of purification and sanctification. Movement through this ritual process, as 
Cooper points out, “was concretely typified in the three-tiered topographical layout of the 
Israelite camp.”
45
 The realm of the common and unclean lay outside the camp. Within the 
camp marked the realm of the common, but clean. The center of the camp, the tabernacle 
area, marked the clean and holy. Further topographical divisions were made between 
Israelites, who were common, but clean, non-Israelites, who were common and unclean, 
and priests who were clean and holy.
46
 Rites of purification brought the common and 
unclean into the realm of the common and clean while the rites of sanctification brought 
the common and clean into the realm of the clean and holy. According to Cooper, in the 
rites of sanctification “holiness was communicated to the purified subject from God 




 The Leviticus account lays out the ancient Hebraic understanding of the cosmic 
order where between the realm of holiness and defilement, God and the evil powers, lay 
the common realm of the natural order. Cooper’s theological works describes how 
movement between these two incompatible poles involves material objects and embodied 
practices, rituals and actions, thus confirming the importance of the material body. More 
germane to a discussion of spirituality, however, is an understanding of the ways in 
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which these material practices, rituals, and actions operate to bring about a real state of 
affairs—a spiritual reality. Spirituality as daily lived experience occupies the space, lives 
within the tension between text and action. Performance becomes the mechanism through 
which and by which content, symbol systems, and text become active in the world.
48
  
Ritual structures form and solidify identity through the mimetic faculty wherein 
performance and symbolic actions play out the tensions between the two poles.
49
 The 
mimetic faculty, according to Taussig, describes the ability “to copy, imitate, make 
models, explore differences, yield into and become other” in such a way that the copy 
draws power from the influences of the original.
50
 Mimesis becomes a means of making 
sense of, realizing, coping with, and brining about a reality that otherwise remains 
unresolved tension. Tension exists between the holy character of God and the common 
state of humanity, between the call of God and the response of individuals, and between 
the demands of the text and the obedience of the people. This marks the space of 
spirituality. Through embodied performance, as reflexive discourse, the act of being “set 
apart” becomes lived out and realized. The “what” and “how” and the “being” and 
“doing” are conjoined in the mimetic performance such that the cognitive function of 
mimesis allows for recognition of the reality being imitated, copied, or yielded into.
51
 
Understood in this way, the performance of and obedience to the ritual prescriptions of 
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the Levitical code, acts of embodied and material practices, bring to reality the conditions 
necessary for  being brought into an exceptional and extraordinary relation to God. 
Bodily actions carry impact beyond the purely material; they extend into the realm of the 
spiritual in formative and determinative ways. The mimetic function of Israel’s ritual 
practices served an iconic purpose, for the practices pointed beyond the mimetic act itself 
to an ultimate spiritual reality. This call to mimetic action continues in the New 
Testament where the obedience required becomes love of God and neighbor. 
 
The New Testament: Incarnation and Mimetic Christology 
 
Exploring the reflexive movement between spirituality and embodiment brings 
the New Testament account of the incarnation front and center. The body marks the locus 
of God’s entrance into the world as the Christ. The incarnation points to the material 
body as the locus of God’s presence, power, and revelatory actions in the world. As 
Johnson states, “The entire point of the incarnation is that the human body of Christ was 
capable of bearing and revealing the power and presence of God somatikos [“in the 
flesh”] need scarcely be argued.” 
52
 The gospels begin with the story of Emmanuel, “God 
with us” (Matthew 1:23), revealed in theological terms in John’s prologue as, “The Word 
became flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1:14). In bodily form, Bultmann notes, the 
Word refers not to a vocal summons but a manifestation.
53
 The incarnation suggests that 
bodies serve as the loci for the manifestation of God’s presence and power. The concept 
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of the body occupies the center of Paul’s theology, for as John Robinson suggests, from 
its various meanings and usages all his great themes are knit together.
54
 Deliverance from 
the body of sin and death comes by and through the body of Jesus Christ sacrificed on the 
cross. Those delivered are baptized into the corporate body of Christ and sustained by 
Christ’s body in the Eucharist. Those who make up the corporate body manifest the new 
life of Christ in and through their bodies. Resurrection of the body into the likeness of 
Christ’s glorious body marks the hope of every believer.
55
 All of these Pauline themes 
draw from the body and point back to the body.  
Understanding the material grounds of spirituality becomes essential, for 
redemptive history plays out in the material world. As Ernst Käsemann makes clear, “All 
God’s ways with creation begin and end in corporeality” such that “the fate of the world 
is decided in the human sphere.”
56
 Actions performed in the body—the bodies of sinner 
and the bodies of saints, like those performed by the incarnate Christ—form, inform, and 
transform the spiritual and social realms.
57
 As embodied beings embedded in particular 
material and social conditions, Christians assume “a sacred vocation through which the 
individual senses, limbs, and organs of one’s own body are offered up entire as a sacrifice 
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Incarnation and the Material Grounds of Spirituality 
 
New Testament spirituality refers to the ways in which material reality responds 
to the call of the transcendent and triune God. The Apostle Paul declares to his Roman 
audience that all of creation groans along with humanity for the redemption of our bodies 
(Romans 8:22-23). God’s work of redemption, God’s call to obedience, takes place with 
the material structures of human existence. The incarnation serves as the exemplary case 
of spirituality manifest in and through material actions, for in the incarnate flesh of Christ 
knowledge and practice, “being” and “doing” conjoin. In obedient response to the call of 
God, Christ cries out “Not my will, but Yours be done” (Luke 22:42). The author of the 
letter to the Hebrews declares, “Although He was a Son, He learned obedience from the 
things which He suffered” (Hebrews 5:8). Christ serves as the ultimate standard for 
mimetic practice, for Christ practiced a spirituality formed in the flesh, formed through 
the suffering flesh, and forged through a life of practiced fidelity to the One who solicits 
our all.  
In the tension between the call of God and human response, within the interplay 
of the call of the Other that beckons a move beyond the self, and the reaching out of the 
self in obedient response to the Other, spiritual formation occurs. The call of God is not 
addressed to a transcendental ego, as Chrétien points out, but to the human person as a 
whole, body and soul.
59
 To perceive the call of God requires a sensing flesh, for the call 
always comes in and through the medium of material bodies. Within the practice of a true 
biblical spirituality, the old dichotomy between sight and hearing, the tension between the 
Hebrew priority of hearing and the Greek priority of sight, dissolves. The call of God, 
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like that of beauty, silently beckons from beyond the self. Beauty addresses the subject in 
another voice, calls out in silence, such that the eyes listen.
60
 Beauty elicits a response, 
not in the sense of provoking a reaction; rather, as Chrétien notes, “In so far as beauty 
dispensed is transcendental, allocated to each thing according to its capacity to receive it, 
beauty constitutes as such what allows each entity to respond by offering its being and 
station.”
61
 The call creates in those called a yearning for its very source, such that, a 
proper response entails the giving of one’s very being. To respond with “here I am, I have 
come to do your will” (Hebrews 10:9) presupposes a prior call to which the proper 
response entails the very life of the respondent—the offering of one’s body as a sacrifice 
to the One who calls (Romans 12:1). 
 
Incarnation and Mimetic Function 
 
 Mimetic function becomes important to spirituality for it identifies a means by 
which knowledge and practice conjoin in daily human experience. Knowing and doing 
combine in the act of mimicry allowing the recognition of the reality being mimicked.
62
 
Biblical spirituality, however, never concerns imitation for its own sake, never for the 
sake of merely presenting again; rather, true imitation always involves a transformation.
63
 
The Christological hymn of Philippians 2:5-11 serves as a key text for mimetic function. 
A call to mimetic focus opens the hymn: “Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ 
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 Imitation of the divine Christ defines the purpose of the 
hymn’s mimetic call. Responding to the call of God, presenting one’s body as a living 
sacrifice, requires imitating the only one who has successfully done both. The call to 
imitate Christ refers to nothing less than adopting toward others the same attitude found 
in Christ—the call refers to proper social relations and ethical behaviors.
65
 Knowledge of 
Christ comes through the practice of imitating Christ in daily experiences with others. 
Through imitating Christ an alternative vision of social order and relations settles deep in 
the body through a transformation of attitude and behavior. The exemplary response to 
the call of God is the embodied actions of the incarnate Christ.  
Biblical spirituality never begins with the individual in isolation, for it is not an 
interior construction applied to the world.
66
 True spirituality occupies the space of 
openness to an encounter with the God; that is, lived spirituality resides within the 
breech, within the reflexive relationship of openness to an encounter with God in which 
self-discovery and ultimate value are realized. Knowledge of God becomes intimately 
tied to our relationships, always mediated, thus the other becomes indispensable to a 
relationship with God.
67
 The creation story and the incarnation reveal this point most 
clearly. The call of God, the voice that solicits our response, always arrives through the 
other—through the friend, enemy, widow, orphan, or the stranger. Through mimetic 
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practice, imitating the attitude of Christ, the response “here I am” is offered in obedient 
response to the call. The Church, the body of Christ, becomes the place where these 
practices find fullest expression. The corporeal body finds ultimate meaning, defines 








IN(CORP)ORATION: BODIES AND SOCIAL BODIES 
  
The previous chapter maintains that embodiment forms an essential and 
indispensable element of biblical spirituality. Narrative accounts in Scripture depict 
spirituality as a lived reality embedded in material conditions and practiced in material 
bodies. These daily material practices center around the call and presence of God and, as 
such, spiritual reality opens up to and through these daily material routines and practices. 
As lived experience, biblical spirituality requires attention to the ways in which bodies 
and material conditions play key roles in making sense of spiritual experience. The 
embodied self always already stands confronted by a call which originates from beyond 
the self and takes the form of an encounter that opens a space for discovery and self-
discovery. Spiritual meaning, like all meaning, arises out of a reflexive interplay in which 
self and other enter a co-constitutive relationship. As such, the meaning ascribed to the 
encounter never comes as a private and individual exercise of the mind, for meaning and 
identity never float free of external influences, but always come mediated through 
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determinants already operative within social bodies.
1
 The perceiving subject always 
already occupies a communal space, as James K.A. Smith notes, “The ‘I’ that perceives is 
always already a ‘we.’ My perception is communal, a debt I owe.”
2
 Never a disembodied 
act, perceiving takes place within the interplay of self and other as bodies that share a 
profound sociality of interaction where meaning arises from the intermingling of subjects, 
consciousness, and corporalities.
3
 There is simply no escaping the profound and 
pervasive formative influence of embodiment and embeddedness on understanding—
physical bodies and social bodies are always intimately intertwined in the act of making 
meaning.
4
 In this chapter I will develop the claim that a consistent and coherent 
spirituality can only develop within the boundaries of institutional religion; that is, I will 




In(corp)oration and Context: Producing Meaning 
 
Commenting on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, Smith notes, “To be 
incorporated is to be knit into the social body and to have the community’s habitus 
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inscribed in my body.”
6
 The term for Bourdieu, refers to a set of dispositions which 
incline agents to act in certain ways.
7
 Thus, the idea of habitus refers to a practical sense, 
it refers to those habituated inclinations that spawn meaningful action in the world—it 
describes an embodied know-how carried within and communicated through a 
community of practice.
8
 Sweetman notes further, that “habitus refers to our overall 
orientation to or way of being in the world; our predisposed ways of thinking, acting and 
moving in and through the social environment that encompasses posture, demeanor, 
outlook, expectations and tastes.”
9
 The body carries this habitus, it is in and through the 
body that the personal and social combine; thus, according to Bourdieu, the body marks 
the site of this “incorporated history.”
10
 These habituated dispositions inscribed in the 
body generate practices, perceptions, and attitudes that become regular and normative 
without being governed by a conscious rule. As such, habitus serves as the condition of 
possibility making a range of perceptual experiences possible.  
Perception can be understood then as both conditioned and conditional and, as 
such, meaning becomes the product of the reflexive interactions of the perceiving subject 
and already existing determinant structures. In which case, as Smith suggests, “The 
                                                          
6
 See Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 82. The idea of incorporation comes from footnote 15 on 
page 82 of Smith’s Imagining the Kingdom. 
 
7
 See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
 
8
 Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 84. 
 
9
 Paul Sweetman, “Revealing Habitus, Illuminating Practice: Bourdieu, Photography and Visual 
Methods,” The Sociological Review 57:3 (2009): 496. 
 
10
 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 93-94. 
127 
habitus both governs and enables perception.”
11
 Given the importance of bodily practice 
and bodily know-how to the making of meaning, Smith entertains the idea of shifting the 
goal of Christian education and formation away from the mere acquisition of a Christian 
world-view towards the acquisition of a Christian habitus.
12
 This shift seems essential to 
developing a healthy and biblical embodied spirituality and, as Smith clearly articulates, 
requires a practicing community.  
Spiritual formation as a fundamental orientation to the world is lived out, not 
simply thought out, and since grounded in day to day practices it becomes a way of life 
oriented toward formative action. A spirituality grounded in material actions, lived in the 
flesh, carried in the joints and marrow of bodies, becomes tangible, practical and capable 
of making sense of spiritual formation. This shift would, as Smith points out, require the 
Church “to attend to the nexus of belief and the body.”
13
 In other words, providing the 
appropriate contexts for the development of a Christian habitus requires an understanding 
of the important connections between the body and the production of meaning and 
beliefs. This proves important to spirituality in light of recent developments emerging 
from the social sciences which suggest that particular aspects of spiritual traditions are 
initially embodied in people and grow out of the daily practices of life, as opposed to 
beginning in doctrine and growing out of prior beliefs and abstract ideas.
14
 The idea that 
traditions are influenced and even formed by embodied practices presupposes a 
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practicing community; likewise, the very notion of habitus requires a practicing 
community. 
 
Meaning: Never “Mine” but Always Already “Ours” 
 
Probably the most debilitating misconception about spirituality in contemporary 
western culture arises out of the belief that biblical spirituality, because private and 
interior, can be practiced without reference to or dependence upon a biblical faith 
tradition. An embodied spirituality proves attractive to a somaticized culture partly 
because a lived spirituality intends to address the ways in which the spiritual can be 
experienced in the mundane practices of daily bodily life. Divorced from the practicing 
community, however, a serious issue arises concerning the appropriation and articulation 
of these experiences. If the perceiving “I” is always already a “we” imbedded in 
communal understanding, then experience can never be simply “mine” but always 
already also “ours.”
15
 To be meaningful at all, experience must be given some content 
and the interpretive contexts will always determine that content. 
 Human experience always entails an act of interpretation which occurs within 
pre-established social structures that provide the concepts and paradigms necessary to 
interpretation.
16
 Spirituality proves no exception, for it cannot escape the influence of 
cultural and historical traditions in shaping experience. This is precisely where the 
warning of subversive narratives and practices become germane to spiritual experience, 
for spiritual experience will be interpreted through some socially established conceptual 
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frame. Too often the conceptual framework or paradigm through which spiritual 
experience gets interpreted lacks any fidelity to the biblical narrative, but make no 
mistake, interpretations will always be loyal to some interest—whether corporate 
capitalism or some other. Interpretations are always theory laden and dependent on 
established structures of meaning, therefore, providing the appropriate contexts for 
making sense of spiritual experience becomes essential.  
 
Faith Traditions: Providing Appropriate Contexts for Spirituality 
 
 The encounter between self and other—between the self and the Transcendent—
originates with a call that elicits a relational response that creates a space for self-
transcendence and self-discovery. This space open to encounter and self-transcendence 
marks the site of spiritual experience—to experience is to encounter, to participate in the 
event—but the experience must be provided with meaning. Outside of a faith tradition 
such experience too often lacks the interpretive structures necessary for constructing true 
biblical meaning. As such, personal spirituality unaffiliated with a faith community lacks 
the tested wisdom of tradition; it lacks the formative structures which accommodate 
coherent integration, thus it becomes subject to fragmentation and relativism.
17
 When 
conceived of primarily as a matter of private and interior concern, Schneiders notes, 
personal spirituality “composed of a variety of intrinsically unrelated practices must draw 
on equally unrelated beliefs to sustain and guide it.”
18
 Additionally, Roof points out, that 
spirituality recast in strictly privatized and psychological terms loses its moorings in 
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traditional religious community so important to cultivating spirituality and thus becomes 
weakened and fragmented.
19
 Untethered from tradition and floating free of proper 
interpretive structures private spirituality amounts to nothing more than a syncretistic 
postmodern bricolage. It may indeed respond well to current felt needs, but it has no 
roots, no past nor future, and lacks the critical and historical reflection of a tested wisdom 
tradition through which it might become coherent and consistent.
20
 The established 
beliefs and practices of a faith tradition, therefore, provide the appropriate contexts for 
shaping spiritual meaning.  
A major part of the Church’s structure of belief takes the form of a systematic 
theology. Schneiders aptly points out, “The consistency of a thoughtful and critical 
systematic theology is a crucial structural support for the faith and morality that are 
integral to any spirituality.”
21
Structural support becomes important precisely because 
believing in and following Christ never take place in the abstract, but always in the 
concrete as specific beliefs and practices by means of which spiritual formation occurs.
22
 
The concrete beliefs and practices of a religious community, what Frohlich refers to as 
“constructed expressions of human meaning,” are therefore essential for making sense of 
spiritual experience since these are the actual, concrete beliefs and practices that shape 
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our understanding of reality.
23
 Tested faith traditions, then, prove much more adequate 
matrices for interpreting spiritual experience and practice than does personally 
constructed composites of beliefs and practices. Thus, spirituality becomes as much 
communal as personal, for community provides the necessary context for a wise and 
sustained spirituality.
 24
 The Church provides the essential context—provides the 
matrices—through which lived spiritual experience develops into a meaningful biblical 
spirituality. 
 The claim that the traditional beliefs and practices of religion are essential to the 
production of spiritual experience requires a note of caution however, for to claim that 
the Church provides an appropriate theological context for interpreting spiritual 
experience in no way implies a rigid and preordained dogmatism subverting and 
subjugating all experience. Theological context conceived more broadly can refer to 
reflection upon the faith community’s inherited tradition as well as its present experience 
of God. As such, it may be argued that theology has an implicit constitutive relationship 
with spirituality and cannot be properly understood without taking this into account.
25
 In 
other words, spiritual experience engages a transformational dialectic between self and 
other—between the transcendent and constructed elements—such that experience is 
never “only” mine, but already “also” ours.
26
 Making sense of spiritual experience, 
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therefore, takes the form of dialectic between the self and existing structures of meaning 
which provides a range of interpretive possibilities.  
 
In(corp)oration and Context: Shaping Experience 
 
 Experience seems always subjective, always interior as “my experience,” and 
always irreducible. As “my experience” meaning becomes reduced to and determined by 
an act of autonomous mental processes. This modern construal of experience in terms of 
individual, oppositional, and self-authenticating mental operations derives from the idea 
of a self-determining human rationality dependent upon interior and exterior senses.
27
 In 
this case, a personal spirituality may be conceived of as an expression of personal 
spiritual experience defined in terms of the self. Problems arise, however, when using a 
phrase like “my experience” to claim uniqueness or irreducibility.
28
 Suspicion about an 
autonomous and pure reason as the origin and principle determinant of knowledge has 
already been raised by Nietzsche; critical as he was that reason alone determines the 
meaning inherent in experience.  
For Nietzsche, any unqualified appeal to experience betrays a naiveté unless 
understood within the context of the social and cultural determinants of experience.
29
 An 
appeal to experience therefore, as George Schner argues, “must include a retrieval of the 
inevitable presence of interpretation and tradition in even the simplest of appeals to my 
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 It might be argued, then, that spirituality can never be reduced to a mere 
expression of spiritual experience. George Lindbeck raises a similar claim regarding 
religion when he suggests that religions produce or shape experience rather than being 
the expressions of experience. Language and symbol, according to Lindbeck, serve as 
necessary preconditions for feeling and experience.
31
 Of course, Lindbeck’s cultural-
linguistic model simply reverses the relation of inner and outer dichotomy so that the 
inner becomes derivative of the outer.
32
 The tenacious nature of the either/or dichotomy 
of “inner” verse “outer” problematizes the study of spiritual experience. It leaves in 
question the authoritative force of inner experience in relation to outer social structures.  
The very idea of an autonomous inner experience has been critically challenged, but 
simply reversing the hierarchy within the dichotomy may not be the answer. For this 
reason it becomes necessary to find a means to collapse the dichotomy. 
  The modern notion of the subject as “inside” and the world as “outside” no 
longer serves as a constructive metaphor, for it has been dismantled by the philosophical 
investigations of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault and Bourdieu. These 
thinkers move away from the modern preoccupation with the subject and return again to a 
more premodern emphasis on forms of mediation.
33
 For them, then, any investigation into 
the nature of experience must involve the study of the various social structures—such as 
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language, symbols, power structures, bodies, and culture—through which experience is 
mediated.
34
 By returning to the notion of embodiment as a methodological principle for 
collapsing dualities it becomes possible to address more fully the nature of experience as 
constitutive of both inner and outer without merely reversing the priority within the 
dualism. 
 
Bodies and Social Bodies: Experience as Transformational Dialectic 
 
Embodiment refers to the essentially relational nature of our being-in-the-world, it 
refers to the ways in which physical bodies accommodate the social environment, learn 
how to relate to others, and learn to understand the actions, sensations, and emotions of 
others.
35
 Humans learn and create meaning through the mimetic function of imitating the 
actions and behaviors of others. The “I” is always already embedded within a complex of 
structures which shape thought and experience. In referencing “my experience” one at 
once realizes a construction dependent on and shaped by a complex of social structures 
and activities. Structures that produce and shape “my experience” are the same social 
structures that provide language, shape attitudes, and establish values through embodied 
practices. In this sense no experience is strictly “mine.”
36
 Experience enters a dialectical 
relationship between self and other in which the give and take of position and counter 
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position, opinion and opposing opinion, become co-constitutive elements in creating the 
potential for sense, reference, and meaning.
37
  
George Schner offers an insightful way of understanding the use of experience in 
theological reflection with his idea of “the appeal constructive.”
38
 In the appeal 
constructive, Schner claims, experience neither possesses the inevitability of a 
transcendental condition of human nature, nor the relativity of a social construction. As 
such, experience enters theological reflection without imposing a universal structure 
independent of faith communities, or without emptying itself of all norming authority.
39
 
The transformational dialectic between the experiencing self and the faith community 
avoids the dogmatic imposition of ascribing fixed meaning on the one hand and 
deteriorating into fragmentation and relativism on the other. Thus, perceptions of 
experience are conditioned by the theological structures operative within the faith 
community, but these structures establish the condition of possibility for interpretive 
interaction thus creating a space for spontaneous and improvised responses to the 
experience.  
 
The Faith Community and Improvisational Action 
 
Perception and action while conditioned and conditional can still be spontaneous 
and improvisational. The capacity to improvise arises out of the social learning process in 
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which social norms and expectations are internalized through practice.
40
 In fact, Bourdieu 
indicates, that habitus makes possible and results in “regulated improvisations.”
41
 Schner 
argues similarly concerning change when he claims that effecting change necessitates 
experience enter into a dialectical relation with already operative determinants.
42
 In other 
words, experience makes change possible, but change necessitates a prior structure to 
which experience can interact. Thus, an already operative structuring structure does not 
restrict the range of experience; rather, it serves as the condition of possibility for 
experience.
43
 Likewise, the theological structures operative in faith communities establish 
the condition of possibility for improvisation.  
Spiritually formative actions can be performed as unconscious improvisations 
arising spontaneously and not merely in conscious response to learned rules or doctrine. 
Improvisation becomes possible, however, only when the unconscious dispositions of 
habitus are inscribed in the body through habituation. Repeated performances of 
particular repertoires internalize norms and expectations such that spontaneous 
improvisation becomes possible. Spiritual formation can involve improvisational action, 
but this requires the development and establishment of a Christian habitus making 
possible regulated actions. 
Spiritual experience as a form of encounter with the divine originates as response 
to a call. The encounter marks the moment of transformation, it is interruptive and 
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disruptive, it creates a discontinuity demanding consideration, revision, and change. By 
embodying spirituality, the encounter creates a space for bodily improvisation, that is, a 
space to fabricate something out of material already at hand.
44
 In this sense, embodied 
spirituality becomes mimetic, transformative, intended to form and create something new 
in response to the divine call. As improvised performance, embodied spirituality becomes 
an act of worship and sacrifice (Romans 12:1). As Benson notes, however, “The 
improvised response is always a repetition and improvisation.”
45
  
The call invites the respondent to join something already in progress, to take on, 
in Bourdieu’s terms, a habitus making possible “regulated improvisations.”
46
 Such 
improvisations are regulated, Benson notes, by the constraints that make them 
particularly Christian, by the Christian context in which the improvisations takes place, 
and by the Christian scriptures as traditionally interpreted within a community of faith.
47
 
Thus, what MacIntyre claims of practices might also be said of improvisations; to enter 
into improvisation is to enter into a relationship not only with contemporary practitioners, 
but also those practitioners who have proceeded and extended the reach of 
improvisational practice to the present.
48
 Thus, spirituality as embodied practice becomes 
the condition for the possibility of regulated improvisations in which spiritual experience 
enters theological reflection dialogically within the faith community. The kind of 
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spirituality discussed here results from a deep desire—a passionate longing—for God. 
Desire needs to be shaped and directed to its proper end, however, and this requires a 
faith community yielding to the formative influence of the indwelling Holy Spirit. 
 
In(corp)oration: An Alternative Community of Desire 
 
 Within the teachings and practices of the faith community the incarnate Christ is 
made known and becomes the model for mimetic practice. The desire of the Son for the 
Father; revealed in the desire of Christ to perform the will of God faithfully, to make the 
presence and power of God manifest to the world in his body, to offer himself up bodily 
for the sake of the other, becomes the model for the mimetic desire of each believer. 
Spirituality centers on desire.
49
 Desire need not be viewed negatively, and it need not be 
detached from the body—in fact, it cannot be detached from the body. The erotic, so 
often shunned because so closely linked to sexuality, can be thought more broadly, 
Sheldrake notes, “as that passionate, specific and partly physical energy that lies behind 
other loves and deep commitments.”
50
 To practice the highest form of desire, as with the 
highest form of love, is to be drawn into the life of God. The purpose of the Church 
entails the formation of just this kind of desire. 
The literary critic René Girard puts forth the convincing claim that the source of 
desire can never be the self alone, for desire arises as a product of the social world. Since 
human beings are not disembodied egos, but rather embodied beings embedded in a 
social world, the body becomes imitatively drawn into the life of the social other. The 
                                                          
49





same social and cultural forces that shape meaning and identity are responsible for 
shaping desire. In other words, the other moves me to desire, to want, and to act, in such 
a way that the desire of the other becomes the source of my desire. Imitating the other to 
the point of desiring what the other desires results in competition with the other over the 
object of desire.
51
 The result, according to Girard, is mimetic violence.
52
 Since this 
violence can be destructive to society, it must be purged; hence, the need for a sacrificial 
victim upon whom to foist the blame.
53
 Once the victim is sacrificed the violence 
threatening social stability subsides and harmony restores for the moment.
54
 This same 
sort of mimetic violence drives the earthly economy of exchange and perpetuates a 
violent cycle of use and abuse. 
 
Empathy, Incarnation, and Kenosis 
 
 The Church serves as an alternative society of desire; a new social order in which 
desire as mimetic violence can be broken. As such, involvement in the life of the Church 
means to have the body drawn imitatively into an alternate society in which an economy 
of love and empathy replaces the economy of exchange. Thus, creating the means 
whereby imitating the life of Christ and others who faithfully practice a desire for God’s 
presence and purpose transforms mimetic practice into spiritual formation. Christ 
reverses this cycle of violence by willfully taking on the role of victim—assuming the 
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sins and guilt of others for their sake. As such, Christ undoes the harm done by mimetic 
violence by refusing to foist blame and instead assumes responsibility for the other. Thus, 
the formative practices of the Church should inscribe in the practitioner this same love 
and responsibility for the other.  
 Creating practices that foster imitation of the life of Christ means the Church must 
take serious the notions of incarnation and kenosis. As a social order in which a new 
desire is instantiated in and through the bodies of believers by means of material 
practices, incarnation becomes the primary mimetic model. Imitating the life of Christ 
requires sharing in the love of Christ for the world, and this requires empathy—the ability 
to feel for, in, and through the other. “At its most basic level,” Mensch claims, “empathy 
is bodily.”
55
 As such, empathy involves a self-emptying and a reception of the other in a 
way that does not demand reciprocity, but reaches out to the other at the risk of 
unrequited love. 
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SPIRITUALITY IN THE FLESH: BELIEF, MEMORY, AND TIME 
 
 The previous chapter points out the embodied and materially embedded nature of 
biblical spirituality and suggests that Christian spiritual formation requires the structures 
of a tested faith community in order to develop properly. Since Christian formation 
involves a sanctifying process understood in terms of daily lived practice, it never occurs 
in the abstract but always through a set of concrete practices and beliefs by means of 
which spiritual growth takes place. A consistent and coherent set of beliefs and practices 
are made possible through the matrices of a tested faith tradition through which they are 
interpreted and become meaningful. In this way, the believing community establishes a 
habitus that provides an alternative orientation to the world; one which stands opposed to 
the imposition of formative structures that subvert biblical spirituality through practices 
antithetical to Christ like character. Thus, it will no longer suffice for the Church to focus 
its concern primarily on what people believe, but must also attend to what people 
practice. In fact, for the Church to address the idea of a Christian habitus in a serious 
manner, it must first rethink the relationship between belief and practice. 
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Embodying Belief: Rethinking Belief as a Practice 
 
 In modern culture belief typically gets reduced to mental ascent to or cognitive 
appropriation of propositional content and, as such, remains independent of the body and 
bodily practice. Arguments in favor of the priority of belief over practice proceed from 
the idea that the content of the belief (doctrine, dogma, program, and the like) precedes 
practice and provides it with shape and meaning. The underlying assumption holds that 
practice is blind without a prior principle in which to evaluate it.
1
 Even those, like 
William Frankena, who want to deny a hard and fast distinction between “doing” and 
“being” relative to moral theory, tend to prioritize principle over practice.
2
 This does, 
however, impose an unnecessary tension between belief and practice in which the 
importance of belief often gets prioritized to the neglect of practice. It might be claimed, 
however, that practice often proceeds and becomes the precondition for establishing 
belief. This should not be surprising given the importance of embodiment and, in fact, 
embodiment serves as the grounds for rethinking the relationship between belief and 
practice.  
 
Michel de Certeau: Belief as an Act 
 
 In his examination of sixteenth and seventeenth century mysticism, de Certeau, 
challenges contemporary notions of mysticism as a spirituality disembodied and detached 
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from the world. His writings demonstrate the embodied and social nature of mysticism as 
a religious life in which practices often become formative preconditions for beliefs and 
interpretations of doctrine.
3
 Within the shattered Christendom of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century centuries, what became essential for these often marginalized social 
groups, according to de Certeau, was not so much a body of doctrine, “but the epistemic 
foundation of a domain within  which specific procedures are followed: a new space, 
with new mechanisms.”
4
 The mystic’s ability to reinterpret tradition in light of changing 
circumstances, de Certeau suggests, was characterized by a set of procedures which 
allowed a new treatment of language—ways of acting became the guide for the creation 
of a body of mystical writings.
5
 Mysticism, then, understood as social practice rather than 
subjective experience, pointed toward a different approach to the Christian tradition in 




For de Certeau, the separation of belief as an act of cultural practice from the 
object of belief becomes symptomatic of the modern condition.
7
 Thus, given the 
important role of practice to the development of beliefs in early mysticism, de Certeau 
develops the notion of believing as practice. In this sense, belief is not understood as the 
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content of a doctrine or proposition, but as an act.
8
 Belief becomes then, for de Certeau, 
“the investiture of subjects in a proposition, the act of uttering it while holding it to be 
true…a modality of the affirmation rather than its content.”
9
 The importance of de 
Certeau’s work to any discussion of embodied spirituality centers on his emphasis on the 
important interplay between bodily practices and the establishing of beliefs. Rethinking 
belief as an embodied act opens up dialogue for further investigation into the importance 
of the body to spiritual formation. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu: Belief as a State of the Body 
 
 Likewise, Bourdieu emphasizes the embodied nature of belief by defining 
practical belief not as a “state of mind” or adherence to the content of dogma or doctrine; 
but rather, as a “state of the body.”
10
 Defined in this way, belief is not the cognitive 
assent to propositions, but describes a functional embodied understanding of the world.
11
 
Practical belief constitutes a direct adherence established in practice between a habitus 
and a structure or particular set of relationships.
12
 As such, enacted belief takes the form 
of bodily memory in which learning instills in the body like a “memory pad” or “as a 
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repository of the most precious values.”
13
 Not only the mundane beliefs of daily life are 
carried in the body, according to Bourdieu, but the most important and fundamental 
beliefs about life are as well. 
 Bourdieu has now made it possible to move a step further by introducing the idea 
of bodily memory. Rethinking belief otherwise than mere cognitive apprehension 
independent of bodily practices, as de Certeau and Bourdieu do, marks a significant gain 
for understanding spirituality as lived experience. But now, however, by expanding 
Bourdieu’s notion of bodily memory it becomes possible to develop a sense of memory, 
not as a gathering of past events in thought, but as the dynamic and lived source of an 
always actual meaning. In this sense, a Christian habitus becomes imperative to 
inscribing in the body a memory of the historical faith and practices of the biblical 
tradition. 
 
Embodied Memory: Revelation, History, and the Call to Remember 
 
Because God’s self-revelation takes place in history, reception of this revelation 
takes the form of memory. As one of the most repeated imperatives in the Bible, 
“Remember!” (Zakhor) demands our attention.
14
 “The call to remember,” Yerushalmi 
notes, “does not arise from a curiosity about the past.”
15
 Which means, remembering 
cannot be reduced to simply recalling the past as something already elapsed, for the call 
to remember becomes an invitation to a particular way of being. Heidegger picks up on 
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this and recognizes the need to think memory otherwise than as a faculty for the past, but 
he fails to solicit help from Greek thought in developing his idea.
16
 The reason for this, 
Zarader points out, is because the typical Greek determination of memory makes of it a 
faculty for the past and, as such, it corresponds with the representation of history as a 
succession of chronological events.
17
 Modern Christianity borrows its primary 
understanding of memory and history from Greek thought. Heidegger wants to interpret 
memory otherwise however, not as one faculty among others, but as a manner of 
existing—as the “gathering of faithful thought.”
18
 Defined in this way, Zarader clearly 
notes, memory “appears as a collection and focusing of the entire soul upon all of 
presence, a presence that includes the past, but not as something elapsed.”
19
  
The idea of history as that which governs and passes through the present in the 
form of memory and serves as the source of an always actual meaning delineates the Old 
Testament Jewish universe. Conceived of in this way, history is not simply that which has 
past as events now complete, but that which extends into the present and stretches forth 
into the future. As such, the very call of God “to be” becomes the call of God to 
remember, in which case memory takes the form of fidelity. Zarader claims, “Memory is 
indeed fidelity, but fidelity to a history gathered, at every instant, into the unity of 
presence, and which can be so because it is fundamentally oriented toward the future.”
20
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Memory then becomes, as Heidegger understood, a gathering around a temporal 
totality—itself alive at every instant.
21
 Bourdeau makes it possible to situate this memory 
in the body as communal memory by means of habitus, thus opening the possibility for 
understanding the bodily enactment of this communal memory as the means by which the 
call of God becomes always present. Thus, the call of God remains always already 
presence—alive in the embodied memory of the believing community by means of 
embodied practices. The bodily practice by which the Church seeks to live out the call to 
remember is the liturgy. 
 
Liturgical Bodies and Historical Memory 
 
The liturgical body can be understood as human physicality itself.
22
 Bodies of 
flesh carry the historical memory and bodies of flesh enact it in the form of liturgical 
practices.
23
 Such a statement should not be taken to imply an endorsement of the 
individualism that has so plagued the Christian Church, however, for understanding the 
liturgical body as human physicality denies any notion of detached and disembodied 
inner selves as the source of spiritual experience and meaning. Any thoughtful reflection 
on human embodiment, with all its vulnerabilities and limitations, leads directly to 
consideration of other bodies.
24
 Returning to embodiment, that often frail and always 
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limited and vulnerable condition of being human, forces us to reclaim our 
interdependence on God and others. The hope of the Church, carried in vulnerable bodies 
and expressed in liturgy, is nothing other than the presence of the God who creates and 
sustains all bodies. Liturgy becomes the means, therefore, by which the corporate 
community lives within the hope and practices the presence of God in the world.  
The embodied rites and ritual practices of the liturgical year—in the form of 
Christian worship—bear continual witness to the presence and powerful acts of God in 
history. The rite repeats annually, but it repeats a singular event that occurred in a 
particular place in the world at a particular time in history, thus the rite marks a 
celebration not so much of the natural year, but of the historical memory.
25
 Within 
historical memory, the acts of God in history are made present and alive through 
embodied actions and in accord with traditional communal understandings. Liturgy, 
therefore, is a communal happening.
26
 Two things are of particular importance here: the 
embodied ritual action through which historical memory is enacted and the communal 
ritual structure through which the act is made meaningful.  
Since the revelation of God never comes unmediated, liturgical practices of the 
interpreting community become essential for making the revelatory event present. 
Sheldrake notes, “The only spirituality that is accessible is incarnational—mediated 
through the cultural and contextual overlays we inevitably bring to nature and our 
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understanding of the sacred.”
27
 Thus, every religious rite and ritual is approached by 
means of a particular habitus, a way of reading the world that has accumulated over 
time.
28
 Accumulated in the body in the form of embodied memory, God’s revelatory 
encounters continue through time carried in the bodies of the believing community 
through liturgical practices.  
Liturgy requires both individual bodies and a social body, as Schmemam notes, 
the original meaning of the word connotes “an action by which a group of people become 
something corporately which they had not been as a mere collection of individuals.”
29
 It 
can also mean a function or ministry performed on behalf of and in the interest of the 
whole community.
30
 As such, liturgy becomes the embodied enactment of a historical 
communal memory making present the call of God to the world. Understood in this 
sense, liturgy defines a way of being-in-the-world, for it serves as a response to the call to 
remember. Liturgy becomes a remembrance carried in the social body and instantiated in 
the bodies of the individuals who form the community. It has often been neglected or 
ignored, however, because it has been so often misunderstood. When addressed in cultic 
terms, as delineating a sacred act of worship, liturgy can lose touch with the reality of its 
material embeddedness in place and time.  
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Sacred Time and Liturgical Cycles: Kairos the Theater of the Encounter 
 
The modern western world operates according to chronological time in which a 
sequential series of “now” moments move unidirectionally into the future in a manner 
that becomes non-repeatable.  Kairos time, on the other hand, refers to an event or 
encounter in which God acts (e.g. Mark 1:15, “the time (kairos) has come”), it is 
qualitative rather than quantitative, both multidirectional and repeatable; it marks a 
propitious moment for response and decision. The liturgical cycles of feasts, seasons, and 
prayers are intended to immerse the Church in a time of liturgical celebration, thus 
creating a moment in which the call of God to remember opens to a welcoming. Kairos 
time, however, should not be understood as somehow removed from materiality, it is not 
some abstract means of escaping the world, but rather defines a way of being-in-the-
world—an openness and welcome receptivity to the encounter. When liturgy becomes an 
abstract feature of Christian worship, understood as a sacred act of worship limited to the 
sanctuary on Sunday morning, it loses touch with the broad reach of kairos.  
Kairos as the Apostle Paul uses the term has its roots in the Hebraic conception of 
time understood on the basis of the event.
31
 In this view of time, the present cannot be 
reduced to a “now” as a pure sequential moment; rather, the present marks the site in 
which all of time gathers in the modality of unity.
32
 The present defines the time of 
responsibility and response, for in kairos the call always already addresses me. “The 
present,” Zarader notes, “is this encounter between the injunction with which the 
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temporal event is charged and the welcome I give it.”
33
 In this sense, history becomes the 
theater of revelation as encounter, a specific domain of existence in which the present 
becomes the time of decision and responsibility for the future. The call does not echo 
from the past as something already complete, but arrives from the future as an invitation 
to encounter. Receptivity to the encounter, however, requires preparation—a making 
ready by means of self-emptying. 
 
Liturgy as Preparation: Kenosis as Receptivity 
 
 Openness to the encounter with God, welcome receptivity to the call, marks the 
space of spirituality. Not a space outside of time, or outside of the body, or an 
otherworldly space, but space created by and in time and approached by means of 
liturgical practices. Preparation for the reception of God’s presence, conditioning the 
welcome of God, takes place within liturgical practices as the enactment of communal 
historical memory. Preparing one’s self for the encounter, living within expectation and 
hope, becomes an orientation to the world—a way of being-in-the-world. It necessarily 
involves the body since it involves a disposition of the body to inhabit its world in a 
certain way. In this case, having absorbed a particular habitus, everyday embodied 
actions are oriented toward the event. The event to which history always points can be 
none other than this revelatory encounter with God. Providing a place for encounter, 
however, requires conditioning—it requires a self-emptying. Not in the form of 
abandonment of the body, not escape from the material world, but an emptying of self-
                                                          
33
 Ibid., 166. 
153 
will, of attitudes and dispositions that refuse an encounter with the sacred. Self-emptying, 
in other words, becomes a form of receptivity.
34
   
 If Christ serves as the paradigmatic mimetic example of a proper relation to God, 
then both self-emptying and receptivity are involved (Philippians 2: 5-11). Incarnation 
requires a self-emptying in which Christ gives up self-will to the will of God (Luke 
22:42), and in doing so becomes able to declare his readiness to live out the call 
(Hebrews 10:9). Thus, to engage in practices that bring one into a proper relation with 
God requires a self-emptying so as to provide a space for the divine encounter.
35
 The 
fundamental questions to be answered, then, concern the manner and purpose of the 
encounter.  
 
Divine Encounter: Spiritual Formation as Responsibility 
 
 Addressing the manner in which an encounter with God becomes possible can be 
complex and controversial, but the purpose here is not the theological and philosophical 
nuances of the arguments. What concerns this discussion is the manner in which God 
encounters us as a call to spiritual formation. In other words, the issue centers on the 
means by which God presences as a divine imperative to direct actions and behaviors 
toward certain ends. It has already been claimed that the historical encounters of God are 
kept alive in the communal historical memory of the believing community. In this way, 
God becomes present in and through the liturgical enactment of the historical memory 
and, as such, the call of God to remember always already confronts us as responsibility. 
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The call to remember, however, cannot merely be an injunction to cognitive recall but 
must be understood as an imperative to act. The call to remember the poor, the widow, 
the orphan, the oppressed, constitutes a call to act on their behalf.  
 
Responsibility: The Call of God and the Face of the Other 
 
 Spiritual formation can never be optional, for persons are always already 
embedded in social structures that form meaning and identity at a pre-reflective level 
across all spheres of existence—formation occurs without consent. While it can be 
neglected, spiritual formation cannot be optional for another reason, it comes as an 
imperative within the divine call. Spiritual formation, as it has been presented in this 
work, becomes a response to the call of God to a certain way of being in the word. It 
cannot be a private and interior matter precisely because it comes as a call away from the 
self toward a responsibility to the other. Spiritual formation simply means to take 
purposeful and meaningful action toward forming and transforming the spiritual sphere 
of human existence in order to fulfill that responsibility. The spiritual sphere, however, 
must not be conceived as a sphere of existence separate from and indifferent to the other 
spheres of human existence for, as Sheldrake has noted, “The only spirituality that is 
accessible is incarnational.”
36
 The call of God comes to me, confronts me, incarnated as it 
were, in the face of the other—in the face of the oppressed, the poor, the stranger, the 
broken. God confronts me in the brokenness and exposure of the other, confronts me with 
a responsibility, such that actions toward the other become actions toward God. 
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 In the judgment scene in the gospel of Matthew (Matthew 25:33-40), Christ 
admits into the kingdom only those whom he declares fed him when he was hungry, gave 
him drink when he was thirsty, clothed him when he was naked, made him welcome 
when a stranger, and visited him when in prison. What followed was an inquiry as to the 
time at which these deeds were performed. To which Christ responded with the familiar 
line: “Whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did for me” 
(Matthew 25:40). The point of the story should not be missed. The call of God came 
through the need of the other and only those who practiced self-emptying were able to 
create a space for the other and respond by receiving the other and attending the need. 
Examples of the call to consider the other abound in Scripture (Cf. Exodus 22:21; 23:9; 
Philippians 2:3; James 2:14-17), and should not be taken as ancillary to Christian 
formation, but must be understood as its very heart. The call of God comes in the 
nakedness and exposure of the other to which the only proper receptivity can be love. 
Nowhere does the command to consider the other become more evident than in the law of 
love (Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 22:36-40; Mark 12:30-31). 
 
Sacred Appearance, Incarnation, and the Law of Love 
 
 It is impossible, Carlo Carretto argues, to love a personal God and be indifferent 
to the suffering brother.
37
 “Because if you pray to the living God,” Carretto continues, 
“you who are living, He, the Living One, sends you to your living brother.”
38
 God 
confronts us in the brokenness and need of the other, but in the encounter with the other 
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only our responsibility is revealed. God comes in the need of the other and in doing so 
reveals our responsibility and opens the opportunity for sacred appearance. The sacred 
becomes present in the world only by incarnating itself. “For the Israelites,” Mensch 
notes, “God becomes present in the law he gives to Moses.”
39
 The very life of Israel, her 
very identity, becomes intimately tied to the law, for by obedience to it Israel becomes 
the people of God. In this sense, as Mensch suggests, the relation of Israel to the sacred 
becomes justice,
40
 but justice as demanded by love, for the law requires love of neighbor 
(Leviticus 19:18) and the just treatment of the stranger and foreigner (Exodus 23: 9). God 
becomes incarnate in the just actions of those who practice the law.
41
 Practicing the 
presence of God becomes the practice of justice and love.  
 Here the point of spiritual practice and the presence of God can be made most 
pointedly. Through practice, the law and its demand for love and justice become 
embodied, inscribed in the joints and morrow of those who practice it as a way of life. 
Obedience to the law becomes formative practice and, as such, those practicing it become 
who they are by what they do. Much like the line from the Gerald Manley Hopkins poem 
As Kingfishers Catch Fire, Dragonflies Draw Flames that declares: “The just man 
justices.”
42
 This is embodied spiritual formation: The faithful person faiths. Through the 
embodied practices of the believing community God becomes present to the world in and 
through faithful response to the call. In other words, God confronts us in the brokenness 
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and need of the other and there reveals our responsibility, but God becomes present in the 
world through our response of love and justice.  
 This brings the law of love front and center for spiritual formation, for Christ 
narrows the principle teaching of the law to love of God and love of neighbor (Mark 
12:30-31). The ultimate call to self-emptying comes through the imperative to love the 
other—expressed most fully in the act of receiving the other. The other confronts us 
within the vicious cycle of an economy of exchange, stands before us broken and 
vulnerable, lays upon us a burden of responsibility, and opens the space for the 
appearance of the sacred. Remain committed to the economy and reject the other because 
there is nothing to receive in return, or exploit the other for what can be taken, and either 
way what appears to the world is the earthly economy in its bare sinful reality. Allow the 
intrusion of the other to break the totality of the economy by responding in love, by 
receiving the other who cannot reciprocate in kind, by practicing the law of love, and 
God becomes present in the world.  
The importance of creating a space for God to become present to the world cannot 
be overstated. For much of the Church, the sacred cannot appear in the world, and this is 
so for a number of reasons. First, revelation has been reduced to the word as written text 
communicated to the believing community in terms of preaching and teaching doctrinal 
content. It no longer refers to a lived encounter opened through historical memory and 
enacted in the exposition of the narrative and the liturgical practices of the believing 
community which serve to situate it and give it meaning. Second, and following 
consequentially from the first, belief has been reduced to the cognitive appropriation of 
doctrinal content and, as such, divorced from practice. This may seem rather 
158 
inconsequential to the point, but it should not, for reducing belief to cognitive 
appropriation means God appears only to the mind as an object, rather than being 
encountered as a Subject to which I am subject. Third, and following as a consequence of 
the first two, the sacred, because it is inaccessible to anything but the mind, becomes the 
concern of the inner spiritual self and serves as a means of mystical escape from the 
drudgery and anxiety of this troubled world. Finally, the spirituality of late capitalist 
culture has become too individualistic and focused too narrowly on self-comfort and self-
consumption to engage the world in any real sense of social justice in which the law of 
love practiced as social actions make God’s presence possible.   
As a result, the Church has in essence bypassed the incarnational aspect of God’s 
presence in favor of some unmediated vision of God. Arising out of this unmediated 
vision of God are two different approaches to the way in which the sacred might be 
experienced. In the first way, as Mensch points out, total separation from the worldly 
economy through mystical experience becomes the goal.
43
 In this way, we are drawn out 
of the world through mystical rapture and separated from the broader responsibility of 
making God present through embodied actions. In the second way, Mensch suggests, 
God gets drawn into the worldly economy and treated as a sacred good to be consumed.
44
 
God becomes a tool used to our advantage. Biblical spiritual formation opposes both, 
teaching instead that God becomes present in the world through the practices of the 
believing body in order to transform it. 
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PHYSICAL SPACE AND SENSUAL BODIES 
 
  
The previous chapter suggests that for the Church to seriously consider 
developing a truly Christian habitus it must first reconsider the relationship of belief to 
practice. Typically spiritual formation is addressed didactically as a set of instructions or 
doctrinal content to which the initiate first gains some mental grasp and then implements 
by way of practice. It seldom works this way, however, for prior to acquiring an 
understanding of a set of doctrines the Christian engages in a set of practices that become 
both formative and transformative. Over time an established set of practices—because 
they become the standard way of doing and seeing things—will influence and shape 
beliefs. This troublesome tension between belief and practice can be overcome by 
thinking of belief as a practice, such that, thinking and doing both become necessary to 
Christian formation. It becomes imperative, therefore, that the Church establish both 
pedagogical content and formative practices that direct initiates in the faith according to 
and in support of historical Christian understandings. 
Rethinking belief and practice as indivisible functions of embodiment forces the 
Church to think more broadly about how spiritual formation actually occurs and, in doing 
160 
so, it becomes clear that implementing practices that aim at biblical spiritual formation 
requires considering more than just the mind and body, for bodily practice entails the 
formative conditions in which the body is embedded. Material conditions such as 
physical place and space influence—facilitate or impede—bodily movements. In other 
words, the physical space will direct bodily action in certain ways thereby inscribing in 
the very bodies of worshipers certain fundamental beliefs and values. For this reason it 
becomes essential that the Church consider the physical layout of worship space, for the 
layout of the physical space not only directs bodily movement but also conveys priorities 
and purposes. 
 
Physical Space, Bodily Movement, and Spiritual Formation 
 
Protestants have long been suspicious of the sacralization of physical objects and 
that suspicion fosters a wariness of discussions concerning sacred space. After all, 
Stephen proclaims that “the Most High does not live in houses made by human hands” 
(Acts 7:48), and Paul claims that the human body now serves as the place of sacred 
dwelling (1Corinthians 6:19). Thus, providing a place for Christians to meet together for 
worship and study might be a typical Protestant understanding of church facilities—a 
place to meet the requirement of “where two or three are gathered in my name, there I am 
with them (Matthew 18:20).
1
Let me not return here to the problem of the Protestant 
desacralization of the world, but let me grant, for the sake of discussion, that Christian 
space simply provides a place to meet together. Worshipers meet together bodily—not as 
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disembodied egos—and because bodies matter, buildings matters. Meeting together in a 
physical space always involves bodily practices—often in the form of ritual practice—
and whether it be acknowledged or not, these practices support conceptions of 
spirituality, God, worship, mission, and purpose. Kent Bloomer and Charles Moore 
suggest, “All architecture functions as a potential stimulus for movement, real or 
imagined. A building is an incitement to action, a stage for movement and interaction. It 
is one partner in a dialogue with the body.”
2
   
  Entering a church, according to Richard Kieckhefer, becomes “a metaphor for 
entering a spiritual process: one of procession and return, or of proclamation and 
response, or of gathering in community and returning to the world outside.”
3
 The very 
form of sacred architecture—the organization of religious space—will follow from the 
conception of spiritual process it intends to foster and the formation it intends to 
promote.
4
 Kieckhefer analyzes three of the most common ways architectural form can be 
linked to notions of spiritual process: the longitudinal space of sacramental churches 
which intend a spiritual process of procession and return; the auditorium space of 
traditional evangelical churches which intend a spiritual process of proclamation and 
response; and the space of modern communal churches with an emphasis on gathering in 
community and returning to the world outside. Thus, Kieckhefer concludes, that religious 
space plays a greater role than merely providing a place for liturgical practice, for the 
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physical space of worship facilities contributes in important ways to the very meaning of 




Physical Form and the Unspoken Message 
 
It seems all too easy to make the layout of sacred space merely a matter of 
cognitive and conceptual concern. In other words, to understand the form of religious 
space presenting a certain visual (mental) image that then says something about 
conceptions of spiritual formation, but this is the Cartesian disembodied model. 
Architectural form directs bodily movement through space and thereby directs bodily 
practice in specific ways—practices that become formative.
6
 Worshipers engage pre-
reflectively in a set of practices from the moment they enter religious space—practices 
that influence the way they understand God, spirituality, community, and worship. In this 
way, if not careful, practices directed by physical form can work contrary to intended 
purposes. 
 For example, a church can unwittingly pander to the consumer mentality of late 
capitalist culture in ways that confirm through practice the deep seated conviction that 
Christianity primarily concerns the cognitive appropriation of doctrine and that Christian 
worship is primarily a matter of individual taste and personal consumption. This becomes 
most evident in the structure of the worship service and the physical structure of the 
worship facility. Often auditorium style facilities have a highly visible and central stage, 
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but no obvious altar and concealed baptismal fonts. The centrality of the lectern and the 
worship band conveys the primacy of sight and sound as the means by which the message 
is received—it becomes highly, if not exclusively, cerebral. Many of these churches 
incorporate into worship practices the use of venues, visualizing technologies, and theater 
style seating without the slightest consideration of the ways in which these support 
practices and instantiate beliefs that are often contrary to the church’s true aims.
7
 To be 
clear, venues, visualizing technologies, and theater type seating are not bad in 
themselves, but they can facilitate practices that unwittingly convey the wrong message. 
Venues can bespeak consumer choice and foster individual preference over communal 
solidarity. Visualizing technologies and theater seating can promote the idea of the 
worshiper as passive spectator and the worship service as a commodity chosen primarily 
for its entertainment value. The very spatial orientation established by the architectural 
structure of worship facilities can belie what is truly intended of the worship service. 
Deriding contemporary worship styles and architectural structures, however, 
proves of little value when they are supported by deep seated beliefs and practices 
imposed by prevailing cultural determinants. My point here remains constructive, aimed 
primarily at raising awareness of the ways in which physical spatial features orient 
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practitioners toward bodily actions that instantiate a particular orientation to spiritual 
formation. In other words, the structural design of worship facilities will influence 
worship practices, facilitating certain practices while impeding others.
8
 Bodily movement 
through physical worship space will never be inconsequential to spiritual formation, for it 
will foster either an active or passive approach to spirituality, it will encourage self-willed 
consumerism or call forth self-emptying, it will facilitate or impede communal liturgical 
practices, but it will never be neutral.  
 
Space, Power and Fidelity: Orienting the Practitioner 
 
Architecture serves as a powerful medium for representing, ordering and 
classifying the world.
9
 As such, Christian space is always dynamic and powerful space, 
and it often belies the function of power operative within it. To understand the power 
within churches—divine, sociopolitical, economic—close attention must be given to both 
material conditions and human experience. The material world can never be neutral; 
indeed, through physical spaces and material objects power structures are articulated and 
maintained.
10
 The form of religious space, and the practices that form engenders, will 
articulate something of the power structure of the church. Thus, practices engendered by 
the form of religious space should serve in support of the message proclaimed concerning 
the centrality of divine power, but at times it does not. In other words, Sunday morning 
sermons can encourage fidelity to the presence and power of God, yet all the while the 
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practices directed by architectural form pledge allegiance to the sovereignty of the self—
consumer choice, private spirituality, productivity and efficiency, entertainment—all 
practices imposed by prevailing cultural power structures. Failure to understand the 
pervasive influence of bodily practice in orienting practitioners, therefore, leaves 
churches vulnerable to practices imposed by worldly power structures—economic, 
cultural, or sociopolitical. 
Religious space becomes powerful in its ability to orient believers both vertically 
toward God and horizontally toward others.
11
 The idea of power, and the fidelity that 
follows from it, cannot be overlooked in the layout of worship facilities and worship 
services, for religious space serves as a means to orient practitioners to power: divine, 
social, and personal power.
12
 This can never be a purely cognitive process, however, for 
religious space already draws the body in and engages it at pre-theoretical level, directing 
it to certain forms of practice and away from others. In this pre-reflexive manner the 
practices engendered by the space already articulates something of conceptions of power 
and fidelity. The issue really centers on whether religious space, and the bodily practices 
that space facilitates, positions God as the center of power and fidelity—not in word only 
but in practice—or whether it places the consumer self at the center as sovereign and the 
object of its own fidelity. 
 Religious space should be designed in such a way as to draw the worshipping 
body into a sense of nearness and awareness of the presence and power of God. It should 
facilitate a sense of interdependence on God and others by directing movement toward an 
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encounter. As a communal act, worship spaces and services should facilitate a sense of 
interdependence by directing active and mutual participation in liturgical practices. As a 
bodily act, worship should engage and connect with the full range of senses; it should 
avoid the purely cerebral approach which limits sensory engagement to the visual and 
audial. As a creative act, worship should be performative and improvisational. As the 
liturgical enactment of communal historical memory, by which the call to remember 
confronts us with a profound sense of responsibility, creative performance becomes a 
means of living out and making present the call of God. Thus, worship must be construed 
in every way as a physical act intended to engage the whole person. 
 
Sensual Bodies and Social Bodies: Physical Bodies at Worship  
 
 Biblical worship is in every way as much sensual as rational, as much physical as 
mental, and both the worship service and worship facilities ought to reflect this fact. 
What the gathered community does in the body at worship matters, precisely because the 
very reason of the gathering gets expressed in and through the bodies of those gathered. 
Bodily movements and gestures express reality in a visible way—that is, they make 
present a reality that would otherwise remain hidden. James Empereur notes, “Something 
of transcendence will never reach visibility if our worshipping communities are not 
physical in their expression.”
13
 For this reason, the very physicality of worship must be 
considered and worship structured in such a way as to direct bodily action in the form of 
liturgical and ritual practice—for physicality marks an essential character of religious 
life. 
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Religious Practice, Social Expression, and Corporate Identity 
 
Ritual practice has long been an important part of group identity, for the regular 
performance of ritual practice expresses group belonging and loyalty.
14
 Nevertheless, the 
very term ritual, and even liturgy, evokes suspicion in many circles of Evangelical 
Christianity, for many of the same reasons that physicality evokes suspicion, but it need 
not. Humans are ritualizing beings, as Ronald Grimes points out, “there is no escaping 
ritualization—the stylized cultivation or suppression of biogenetic and psychosomatic 
rhythms and repetitions.”
15
 Ritual, as Margaret Kelleher suggests, refers to “social, 
symbolic, and processual action in which meanings and values can be communicated, 
created, and transformed.”
16
 Thus, the action performed in the body at worship not only 
forms individual and corporate identity and meaning, but it becomes a means of 
conveying that identity and meaning publicly.  
Ritual practice becomes a means of social expression—of making visible a reality 
that otherwise may remain hidden. It is social, as Kelleher claims, because ritual emerges 
from within the life of a social body, is performed by the social body, and participates in 
the life of the social body. Ritual expression is symbolic, she claims, because symbols 
serve as the basic units of ritual practice, thus words, gestures, actions, relationships, and 
the arrangement of religious space can all serve symbolic functions. The processual 
nature of ritual, Kelleher suggests, derives from the dynamism within ritual action—it 
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 Ibid., 42-43. 
 
16
 Margaret Mary Kelleher, “The Liturgical Body: Symbol and Ritual,” in Bodies of Worship: 
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gathers around a movement or rhythm.
17
 As such, ritual serves as a support structure for 
meaning and belonging and therefore can never be neutral regarding formation of identity 
and never operates independent of physical bodies. In fact, Catherine Bell, who was 
influenced by the work of Bourdieau, suggests that ritualization produces ritualized 
bodies through the repeated interaction of bodies with the ritual structures.
18
 That is, the 
physical movement associated with ritual practice creates a structure which, in turn, acts 
to restructure bodies towards some determined end.
19
 It should be evident, then, that 
physical bodies and physical space are important to the structure and meaning of worship, 
but now let us look more closely at the body in worship 
 
Bodies, Sacrifices, and True Worship: Romans 12:1 
 
 In the Apostle Paul’s letter to the Romans, having redrawn the boundaries of the 
people of God, Paul turns his address in Chapter 12 to the required characteristics 
incumbent upon the new community. In the opening verse, Paul declares that offering the 
body as a spiritual sacrifice to God becomes the believer’s act of true worship (Romans 
12:1). Tellingly, Paul does not abandoned the language of cultic ritual practice, but takes 
up cultic terms in order to instill within them a new meaning.
20
 Not by accident, Paul uses 
language that would connect with his audience, but connect in a way that confirms the 
importance and continuation of bodily practice in worship. The language of sacrifice 
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19
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which was so central to ancient worship, Douglas Moo notes, “made it a natural and 
inevitable vehicle for the early Christians to express their own religious convictions.”
21
 In 
Paul’s redefinition of the term, the sacrifice God requires of the new community, as Dunn 
notes, “is no longer that of beast and bird in temple, but the daily commitment of life 
lived within the constraints and relationships of this bodily world.”
22
 In other words, the 
sacrifice required of the new community should not be understood in reference to specific 
objects given; but rather, to the very body of the giver.  
 Paul qualifies the sacrifice of the body, as Moo makes note, with three 
adjectives.
23
 As a “living” sacrifice it continues in its efficacy, as opposed to dying at the 
moment of sacrifice. As such, the sacrifice marks a continual living out of an offering of 
the entire self to God as a means of worship. As a “holy” sacrifice it implies that the 
offering of our bodies involves our being set apart from the common world in dedicated 
service to God—which carries both cultic and moral implication.
24
 Only bodily sacrifice, 
as a daily living out the process of being set apart to the service of God, can become a 
“well pleasing sacrifice.”
25
 In redefining the requirements of cultic worship in this way, 
Paul encourages a different kind of community—a community marked by the sacrifice of 
self-giving. While at the same time, Dunn claims, insisting that the sacrifice take concrete 
bodily expression in order to prevent his thought from degenerating into a form of 
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“unworldly pietism” or “enthusiastic dualism.”
26
 Paul presents a view of Christian 
spirituality, therefore, not as disembodied or body denying, but as a way of living in and 
through the physical body. 
 
Worship, Material Objects, and the Sensate Body 
 
 Even though Paul defines the sacrifice required of Christians as spiritual, he does 
not separate it from the material world and reduce it to mere interiority. True worship 
requires the body, thus the body becomes the locus of worship and the spiritual life. After 
all, the body serves as the means by which humans can sense things—the very notion of 
sensing requires the sensate body. There is no need to demand a strict distinction between 
the inner senses and the outer senses as though they operate independently. To see with 
the “eye of the mind” requires the physical sense organ to supply it with the material for 
contemplation, but unless the eye of the mind sees, nothing has really been seen.
27
 The 
same can be said of the soul “hearing,” for example, when it imaginatively recollects or 
gives mental attention to God, but it does so by means of being conjoined with the 
auditory function of the physical body.
28
 Thus, sensing has a dual aspect, according to 
Catherine Pickstock, an inner and an outer which stands in accord with the double 
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biblical meaning of the “heart.”
29
 Worship requires a response of the incarnate soul—the 




Bodily Participation in Worship 
 
 The body participates in worship through a wide range of symbolic actions which 
in one way or another engage the physical senses. In baptism the body and water come 
into physical contact in the ritual act of cleansing intended to signify identification with 
Christ and a being set apart to God. The body engages through tactile sensation as the 
water touches the skin, the ears hear the words spoken as the rite is administered, and the 
eyes engage with others present. In like manner, the Eucharist engages all the senses as 
the bread and wine are consumed. The Eucharist becomes a full sensory experience in 
which the elements are present to sight, smell, touch, taste, and hearing. Additionally, 
many churches practice anointing with oil and laying-on of hands which involve body to 
body contact, it involves tactility as well as sight and hearing. Some traditions practice 
burning incense which involves olfactory perception. Further, these practices involve 
material objects such as oil, water, incense, bread and wine which situate the act of 
worship materially.  
 An important point should be noted, these practices do more than serve as a 
means to mental representation, they do more than elicit cognitive recall or represent 
some external reality. They are the enactment of communal historical memory by which 
the divine call to remember continually confronts us with an imperative of responsibility. 
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They provide the means by which God is made manifest to the world in tangible visible 
form. These material actions give rise to spiritual reality. Remember the Jewish prayer; 
“We thank You for the covenant sealed in our flesh.” The act of circumcision, performed 
in the body as an act of obedience to God, brought about the spiritual reality of being 
rightly related to God and one another through fidelity to the covenant. God does, 
nevertheless, require more than the foreskin—relationship to God goes deeper than the 
flesh and involves more than national identity—God requires our whole being and thus 
circumcision of the heart (Deuteronomy 30:6; Romans 2:29) implies a total self-giving, a 
total fidelity, in which the Christian lives out obedience to God daily through bodily 
actions. As part of the continual process of spiritual formation, the bodily participation in 
the liturgical practices of the Church marks a necessary condition for an ongoing 













SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The purpose of this work has been to explore the role of the body and material 
practice in spiritual formation with the intent to ascertain the ways in which spiritual 
meaning and identity are formed. As an interdisciplinary reflection, this work has drawn 
from a diverse range of scholarly resources, such as cultural anthropology, the social 
sciences, the social science of religion, biblical studies, philosophy, and theology. Aimed 
at provoking further thought on the subject, this work argues that bifurcating tendencies 
in the history of western thought have obscured thinking about or denied access to the 
relatedness of two very important dimensions of human existence: spiritual and 
corporeal. On the one hand, spirituality becomes nothing more than an abstract quality 
that has little or nothing to do with daily lived experience. This has left much of the 
Church without any real understanding of what spirituality means to the actual lives they 
live here and now. On the other hand, the body becomes a peculiar character, present yet 
elusive, God’s good creation yet our biggest problem, ignored by the church yet 
fashioned by culture and society. Thus, rejecting the body or taming it becomes the 
default theological position of many within the Christian tradition. 
 These views arise as a result of a long history of ambivalence towards the body. 
The search to ground the self in terms of immaterial and immutable properties tended to 
direct discourse away from the tangible yet mutable and vulnerable body. With the rise of 
reason and the transcendental self in the modern era, the body all but disappears. It did 
not disappear completely; however, it remained hidden deep in the recesses of tradition 
waiting to be remembered. By mid-twentieth century it reappeared with a vengeance, 
174 
remembered by those disgruntled with its neglect under the cold reign of reason. 
Nevertheless, the cult of the sensual, like the cult of the cerebral, neglects the body as 
such. If the cult of the cerebral denied that the body mattered, the cult of the sensual has 
made it the locus of all that matters. 
 As the source of all that matters the body gets conscripted through practices 
imposed by social and cultural forces whose loyalty belongs to capitalist agendas and not 
biblical spiritual formation. The only way to effectively oppose these formative forces is 
to understand the body and its role in forming identity and producing meaning. If the 
body “knows” through repeated performance of actions, then the Church needs to 
develop more fully and intentionally its own formative practices. Bringing together 
knowing and doing, belief and practice, as co-constitutive and mutually necessary to 
biblical spiritual formation define the purpose of this work. Spirituality cannot be reduced 
to an inner journey; rather it involves the entire person, body, soul, and social and cultural 
conditions. This includes the physical space used to support spiritual processes, for 
physical space serves as part of the formative material conditions which shape 
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